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Abstract: International investment law stabilizes investment
participants' behavior and expectations and investment outcomes.
This law controls global decision-making by modulating power and
authority between participants through four processes:
(1) triggering shifts in power and authority; (2) draining power and
authority from states; (3) transferring this power and authority to
other decision-makers; and (4) restoring state power and authority.
Some policy-makers in both powerful and less powerful states regard
these shifts in power and authority as unjustified attacks on
sovereignty. To minimize these policy-makers' concerns, this article
recommends modifications to international investment law that will
promote global well-being further.
INTRODUCTION
International investment law has developed in response to
globalization and the dramatic increase in cross-border investments.
Contemporary international investments, such as power projects or
tourist resorts, are so massive that they involve numerous
participants,' including multinational corporations, joint venture
vehicles, local investors, governments, their political sub-divisions
and regulatory entities, insurers and banks. These participants
establish their specialized roles and stabilize common expectations
through a framework of norms, project agreements, guarantees,
multilateral and bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), arbitral
awards and court decisions.
International investment law reinforces investment roles and
expectations by redistributing power and authority among decision-
makers2 so that they can prevent and rectify deviations by
participants from investment arrangements. Although states are the
loci of power and authority in classical international law,3
1. In this article, "participants" refers to parties connected with international
investments.
2. In this article, "decision-makers" refers to participants who can affect
investment outcomes.
3. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("Sovereignty is supreme authority"); id. at 500("formerly, states alone used to be the subjects of international law").
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international investment law transfers some of this power and
authority to other decision-makers, including investors, arbitral
tribunals and foreign courts. Investment treaties and contracts
contain express investment protections, including the rule of law, due
process and the right to own property.4 These provisions often
demand compliance by host states even if these norms intrude upon
areas of sovereign control, such as monetary policies or the
exploitation of resources. If host states ignore these demands for
compliance, control mechanisms are triggered. Arbitral tribunals
may be constituted pursuant to dispute resolution provisions in
investment agreements to restore the norms from which the host state
deviated.' International investment law then calls on foreign courts to
enforce these arbitral decisions.6 When such control mechanisms are
successful, participants adjust their behavior to avoid or minimize the
costs of non-compliance, thereby restoring equilibrium in investment
arrangements, bolstering international investment law's credibility
and promoting international investments.
This introductory analysis of power and authority in international
investment law raises detailed questions about the international
decision-making process.7 When and how are shifts in power and
authority triggered? What sorts of power and authority are involved?
To whom is power and authority transferred? How effective is this
transfer? When, if'at all, might this power and authority be regained?
4. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and
the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Oct. 31, 1997, arts. 3-5, 2136 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter Belgium-
India BIT] (providing equitable and most-favored nation treatment to investments
and timely compensation for expropriation); Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of the Republic of India for the
Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 9, 2002, arts. 3-5
[hereinafter Cyprus-India BIT] (copy of file with author) (expressing the same).
5. See, e.g., Belgium-India BIT, supra note 4, art. 9 (providing that parties
arbitrate disputes that are not resolved in six months); Cyprus-India BIT, supra
note 4, art. 9 (expressing the same).
6. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention] (establishing that state courts are generally obliged to enforce
foreign arbitral awards).
7. In this article, "decision-making" refers to the process in which decision-
makers exchange claims and counter claims and deploy strategies and counter
strategies to reach investment outcomes.
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What are the global consequences of redistributing sovereign power
and authority? Are decision-makers accountable for their use of
redistributed power and authority? How should international
investment law be appraised against global policies?8
Scholars do not appear to have addressed these questions directly.
Legal discussions have usually examined the restraints that legal
norms, such as fair and equitable treatment and compensation for
expropriation, place on states in relation to their treatment of
investments and investors. 9 Other commentaries have examined the
balance between investor protections and sovereignty over natural
resources.'° This scholarship, while important, does not analyze fully
international investment law's impact on global decision-making and
outcomes. By focusing on international investment law's impact on
sovereignty, i.e., the authority and power to self-govern in relation to
internal matters such as taxation and external matters such as
defense," few scholars have taken the critical next step of examining
global outcomes of shifts in power and authority.
8. In this article, "policies" refers to international law's goals.
9. See generally Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 1999 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
99 (discussing fair and equitable treatment); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties
and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS
261, 339-408 (1997) (defining standards of treatment of foreign investments,
including fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security and most-
favored nation treatment); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 108-14 (1995) (discussing compensation for
expropriation); F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243-44 (discussing equitable treatment
and full protection and security).
10. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the United Nations Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 401 (1994) (discussing U.N. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 300-29 (1991) (discussing the relationship between sovereignty and
natural resources in the context of international business).
11. Cf The Island of Palmas (Award) (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 831, 838
(1928) (stating that sovereignty "is the right to exercise.., to the exclusion of any
other State, the functions of a State.") (per Max Huber); W. Michael Reisman, Why
Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 516, 516 (2004)
("[S]overeignty in its modem sense is simply the demand of each territorial
community ... to be permitted to govern itself without interference by the entire
organized community"(emphasis added).).
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To understand and appraise international investment law's impact
on global outcomes, this article dissects the relationship between
power, authority and international investment law. 12 Power refers to
the ability of decision-makers to impose their will on other
participants to affect outcomes.'3 Authority refers to the deployment
of power coupled with an expectation of compliance, or at least
recognition of that expectation, by other participants. 4 Unlike
sovereignty, authority and power do not refer simply to states'
autonomy to act, but also include the effect of all decision-makers'
actions on other participants and on outcomes. Whereas other
scholarship examines the relationship between international
investments and state sovereignty, i.e., states' ability to act in relation
to investments, this article's analysis of power and authority goes
several steps further towards determining whether these actions
secure compliance from global participants and anticipating counter-
demands and responses from other decision-makers. Through such
an analysis of power and authority in international investment law,
global decision-making and outcomes can be appraised.
This article argues that international investment law shifts power
and authority from states to investors, tribunals and other decision-
makers. These shifts produce outcomes that only partially support
global policies. To better promote international investment law's
policies, power and authority flows should be modulated. Part II
maps the four processes through which international investment law
shifts power and authority between decision-makers: (1) triggering
shifts in power and authority between decision-makers;"5
12. Cf Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in
International Society, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 43, 51 (R. St. J.
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1989) ("[I]ntemational law is a product
of the interplay of power and interest conditioned by material conditions and
perceptions of need and aspirations.").
13. Cf id. at 49 (stressing power's relationship with international law).
14. See Rosalyn Higgins, Integrations of Authority and Control, in TOWARD
WORLD ORDER AND DIGNITY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYERS S. MCDOUGAL 79, 81
(W. Michael Reisman & Bums H. Weston eds., 1976) (discussing meanings of
power and authority under New Haven jurisprudence); cf H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that laws are accompanied by a
recognition that postulated rules are of a legal nature).
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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(2) draining state power and authority once the international
investment law has been triggered; 16 (3) transferring this power and
authority to other decision-makers; 7 and (4) restoring power and
authority to states. 8 Part III appraises the effects of power and
authority shifts against the global policies of development, equity
and control. 19 Finally, Part IV projects investment trends and makes
recommendations to promote global policies further.2 °
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, POWER
AND AUTHORITY
Although some states claim to exert great authority over foreign
investments, 2' multinational corporations and capital-exporting states
have secured greater investment protections over time. Repeated
signaling of proposed investment norms through international
agreements and subsequent patterns of compliance with these
agreements have stabilized expectations of appropriate state
behavior. Arbitral tribunals and international courts have usually
been custodians of international investment norms when called upon
by investors and states to adjudicate investment disputes.22 National
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18. See discussion infra Part II.D.
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State, 176 RECUEIL
DES COURS 259, 309 (1982-11I) (noting that the UK government regarded its
sovereign right to regulate natural resources as unconstrained by foreign licenses it
had granted); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Investments and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DE COURS 261, 279 (1997)
("Most capital importing countries took the view that defining the standards of
admission, treatment and compensation (in case of nationalization) of foreign
investors was a matter purely within domestic law and jurisdiction.").
22. See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales v. United Mexican States (Award),
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/laudo05l903FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb.
11, 2005), translated in 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004) (adjudicating foreign investor's
claim had Mexico had violated its investment treaty); Case Concerning Elettronica
Sicula S.P.A (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 82 (July 20) (rejecting the United
States' argument that Italy violated its Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
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courts have often deployed their enforcement authority to support
decisions by international tribunals. 23 Through such a convergence of
decision-makers towards proposed norms, international investment
law has consolidated power and authority over participants.
A. TRIGGERING POWER AND AUTHORITY SHIFTS
In international investment law, triggers begin the shift of power
and authority from states to other decision-makers. In the simplest
case, a state, after conducting a full analysis of the costs and benefits
of entering into the international investment framework, expressly
signals its intention to enter this framework, such as by inviting
investments. Investors respond to these signals, leading to investment
agreements between local and foreign investors and host states.
These investment agreements contain triggers that redistribute power
and authority among investment parties.24
1. Triggers
An investment treaty between a host and foreign state triggers the
host state's loss of power and authority over investments in its
territory to the foreign state's investors through provisions that
provide investor protections and that transfer the treaty's
enforcement from signatory states to their investors-the parties with
direct interest in investment protections. The signatory states'
investors, who may not have participated in the negotiation and
conclusion of an investment treaty, may enforce the treaty's
investment protections through the treaty's dispute resolution
procedure, which often stipulates arbitration as the final recourse. In
Navigation).
23. See, e.g., Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., Case No. T 9737-
01, slip op. (Svea Ct. App. May 13, 2003) (translation in English), available at
http://www.mfcr.cz/index-en.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2004) (upholding
arbitration award); Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for
Industrialization, 1995 Q.B. 282 (Eng.) (upholding leave to enforce arbitration
award in investment dispute).
24. See generally Andrew Guzman, Why LDCS Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 640
(1998) (discussing investment agreements and the reasons why states, especially
developing states, ratify them despite the amount of control that developing states
relinquish through these agreements).
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this way, investment treaties trigger signatory states' loss of control
over investments in their territory to other signatory states' investors.
Although some investment treaties restrict their triggering effect
by expressly limiting who qualifies as an investor and what qualifies
as an investment,25 other treaties propose wide meanings for
"investors" and "investments." Decision-makers, such as tribunals
and investors, have reinforced these proposals by accepting that such
investment treaties protect even foreign minority shareholders in
investment companies.26  Where minority shareholders hold
beneficial interests in contract rights, these beneficial interests may
be considered investments under investment treaties that define
"claims to money" as investments 7.2 The confluence of power and
authority behind such far-reaching proposals constrains state power
over foreign investors with direct or indirect interests in projects
situated in the state's territory.
25. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Austria
and the Government of the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Nov. 8, 1999, art. 1(c), 2164 U.N.T.S. 106 (requiring participants to
hold at least 51% of shares or to exercise decisive control over the investment
vehicle in order to qualify as investors under the bilateral investment treaty
("BIT")).
26. See Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy)
(Award), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20) (holding that U.S. shareholders of an Italian
corporation could bring claims against Italy for measures imposed on the
corporation); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina (Jurisdiction),
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, slip op. 48 (July 17, 2003) (noting extension of
foreign investor protections to a corporation's shareholders); Enron Corp. v.
Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, slip op. 49 (Jan.
14, 2004) (stating that under the provisions of the Argentina-U.S. bilateral
investment treaty, non-controlling or minority shareholders may bring claims
separate from a corporation), available at http://www.asil.org/ilib
/Enron.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2004); GAMI Invs., Inc. v. Gov't of the United
Mexican States (Final Award), slip op. 37 (UNCITRAL, Nov. 15, 2004) ("[T]he
fact that [claimant] GAMI is a minority shareholder does not affect its right to seek
the international arbitral remedy.").
27. See SGS Soci~t6 G~nrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 42 I.L.M. 1290, 1311, 135
(Aug. 6, 2003) (stating that under the BIT in question, investment includes every
kind of asset and claims to money); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic
(Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, slip op. 63 (Dec. 3, 2003) ("A
company, shares held in a company or rights under a contract, any contract, qualify
as an investment.").
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"Umbrella clauses" in investment treaties are a potentially potent
trigger. Umbrella clauses purport to bind signatory states to all their
undertakings, including commitments that would otherwise not be
treaty obligations 8.2 Because umbrella clauses boot-strap non-treaty
undertakings onto investment treaties, they are "far-reaching in
scope,. . . automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation,
[and] burdensome in their potential impact upon a Contracting
Party[.] ' 29
An umbrella clause was recently given legal effect in SGS Socit6
G~nbrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines ("SGS v.
Philippines").3  The tribunal found that a BIT provision stating that
"[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has
assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by
investors of the other Contracting Party" transformed every
contractual obligation in relation to BIT investments into
international law obligations.31 The tribunal reasoned that protecting
investments through an aggressive interpretation of umbrella clauses
supported the BIT's object of promoting investments.
There is, however, some doubt about whether umbrella clauses are
triggers. Six-months prior to SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal in SGS
Socit G~n&ale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan took the opposite view, i.e., that umbrella clauses do not
transform contract obligations into international law obligations
absent clear words evincing such an intention.31 The tribunal found
that an article stating that each contracting state "shall constantly
guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with
respect to the [BIT] investments" was insufficiently specific to turn
28. See OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, art. 2,
7 I.L.M. 117, 123 (1968) ("Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of
undertakings given by it in relation to property of nationals of any other Party.");
id., Notes and Comments to Art. 2, l(b) ("any right originating under such an
undertaking gives rise to an international right").
29. SGS v. Pakistan, 42 I.L.M. 1290, 167.
30. SGS Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
31. Id. T 127-28.
32. SGS v. Pakistan, 42 I.L.M. 1290, TT 163-74.
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all commitments--contractual, statutory and administrative, whether
unilateral or otherwise-into international law obligations.33
In spite of the SGS tribunals' directly conflicting reasoning, the
triggering effect of umbrella clauses may be confirmed before too
long. The trend in international investment law over the last half
century has been to support investors and encourage investments by
weakening state power and authority.3 4 This trend does not show
signs of abating because investors continue to seek new markets and
developing states continue to seek capital, expertise and
technology.35  In this pro-investment climate, participants'
expectations regarding umbrella clauses could well settle around a
wide reading of these clauses to protect international investments
further.
2. Proxy Triggers
A "proxy trigger" is a trigger that is created by parties other than a
host state that erodes that state's power and authority. Tribunals and
investors have combined the well-established prescription that a
tribunal is competent to determine its own competence3 6 with their
recommendation that a non-signatory state should be bound by an
investment agreement if its consent can be implied from the
investment project's circumstances. In Bridas S.A.P.LC. v.
33. Id.; see Salini Construtorri S.p.A v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
(Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, slip op. 123-126 (Nov. 15, 2004),
(finding that BIT clause that obliged each party to create and maintain in its
territory a legal framework favorable to investments was not an umbrella clause).
34. This trend is evinced by, inter alia, the increasing number of BITs. The
first BITs were concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with Pakistan and
the Dominican Republic in 1959, and in forty years, 1,332 BITs had been
concluded by 162 states. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 1 (charting
growth of BITs); UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S
8-10 (1998) (noting the dramatic increase in the number of BITs during the 1990s).
35. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 9, at xi (stating that foreign
investments are forecast to grow and that states have, in increasing numbers,
concluded BITs).
36. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration (1998),
art. 6 (stating that the arbitral tribunal determines its own jurisdiction), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf documents/rules/rules arb en
glish (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Turkmenistan (Partial
Award), ICC Case No. 9058/FMS/KGA, slip op. at 9-10 (June 25, 1999) (asserting
that the arbitral tribunal had competence to determine its own jurisdiction).
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Turkmenistan (Partial Award), the Bridas conglomerate entered into
a joint venture agreement with a private Turkmen company for the
exploitation of oil in Turkmenistan.37  The government of
Turkmenistan was not a signatory to the agreement, which contained
an arbitration clause.38 When the joint venture encountered problems,
Bridas commenced International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC")
arbitration against Turkmenistan.3 9
Although Turkmenistan claimed that it was not a party to the joint
venture agreement and was therefore not bound by the arbitration
agreement,"° the ICC tribunal exerted jurisdiction over Turkmenistan
by accounting for "the surrounding circumstances [that] provides the
context for the JV Agreement" and finding that Turkmenistan had
evinced an intention to be bound by the joint venture agreement even
though Turkmenistan had not signed it.4 Turkmenistan's conduct
prior to the formation of the joint venture showed its high level of
involvement because Turkmenistan had sought the international
tender for the exploitation of its natural resource--oil. Further, some
joint venture agreement provisions could only be fulfilled by
Turkmenistan, including guarantees as to taxes, exchange rates and
duties,42 and because there was a "significant overlap in personnel
who controlled the project through the Government."43 With a sleight
of hand, the tribunal stated that these circumstances created a
legitimate expectation in Bridas that Turkmenistan would be bound
by the agreement and such an expectation "can translate into
intention." 44
The tribunal ignored the fact that Turkmenistan had sought not to
enter the investment directly and instead facilitated arrangements for
Turkmen companies while keeping a close eye on its natural
37. Bridas S.A.P.LC. (PartialAward), slip op. at 2.
38. Id. at 2-4.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id. at 15-17.
43. Id. at 19.
44. Id. at 19.
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resources.45 By ignoring the corporate structure of the Turkmen
entity, the tribunal bound Turkmenistan to the joint venture
agreement.4 6 If other decision-makers accept the Bridas tribunal's
reasoning, host states could find their power and authority eroded in
spite of their intentions and efforts to preserve their control over both
local and foreign venture partners operating in critical industries.4 7
Some courts have, however, resisted tribunals' and investors'
aggressive attempts to constrict sovereignty absent an express
agreement by states to be bound by investment agreements. The U.S.
Fifth Circuit opposed the Bridas award, holding that the four comers
of the joint venture agreement did not bind Turkmenistan to
arbitration because Turkmenistan neither signed the agreement nor
was named as a party in the agreement.48
In spite of such rulings against inadvertent triggers of power and
authority transfers, three factors indicate that the authority of proxy
triggers over states may be accepted over time. First, some courts
support proxy triggers by holding that arbitral tribunals can correctly
bind non-signatory states to arbitration agreements,49 thereby
allowing an investor to enforce an award against a non-signatory
state in these forums. Second, arbitral tribunals have bound
companies to investment agreements they did not sign under alter-
45. See id. at 2 (explaining that while the government of Turkmenistan
negotiated with Bridas to form the joint venture, it was not a signatory to any of
the operative documents).
46. Id. at 18-20.
47. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt (Award), ICC Arbitration No. VD/AS No. 3493, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 46, 62
(Mar. 11, 1983) (finding that Egypt was bound by an investment contract that it did
not sign).
48. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th
Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is apparent that the four comers of the agreement did not bind the
government to arbitrate this dispute."); see also Roger Alford, Binding Sovereign
Non-Signatories, 19-3 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 14 (2004) (discussing the Bridas
Fifth Circuit decision); Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pacific Properties Ltd.,
3 ICSID (W. Bank) 79 (Cour d'Appel, France, July 12, 1984) (translation in
English), affd Cour de Cassation 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 96 (Mar. 11, 1987) (finding
that Egypt was not bound by the arbitration agreement that it did not sign).
49. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 92 (Amsterdam Dist. Ct. 1984) (translation in
English) (granting leave to enforce ICC award that determined that a non-signatory
state was bound by an arbitration agreement).
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ego, estoppel and agency theories.5 0 In the incremental development
of law, these prescriptions may eventually extend to non-signatory
states. Third, courts and tribunals have applied principles of state
responsibility for instrumentalities5' to impute the liability of
companies onto states.52 These factors do not show signs of abating
and proxy triggers may eventually penetrate states' jurisdictional
defenses. 3
50. See Dow Chemical France v. Isover Saint Gobain (Interim Award), ICC
Case No. 4131 (Sept. 23, 1982), in SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS,
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985. 150 (1990) (holding Dow
Chemical Company (USA) responsible for its subsidiary, Dow Chemical France);
see also Bernard Hanotiau, Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations Involving
Multiple Contracts-Parties-Issues, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 251, 258-61 (2001)
(discussing the agency theory); Otto Sandrock, Extending the Scope of Arbitration
Agreements to Non-Signatories, in THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT-ITS
MULTIFOLD CRITICAL ASPECTS, ASA Special Series No. 8 165 (Marc Blessing ed.,
1994) [hereinafter THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT] (explaining how an arbitration
agreement extends to non-signatories under the "group-of-companies" and
"piercing of the corporate veil" doctrines); Sigvard Jarvin, Extending the Scope to
Non-Signatories; Group of Companies Doctrine, in THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT, id. at 181 (examining the group of companies doctrine and its
consequences).
51. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at arts. 4, 8, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, ch. IV.E. 1 (2001) (stating that the "conduct of any State organ shall
be considered an act of that State under international law," and that a person's
conduct shall be attributed to the state if he is acting on the state's instructions or
under the state's direction); Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n., 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, arts. 4, 8, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch. IV.E.2 (2001) (discussing
cases on responsibility of a state for its instrumentalities and organs).
52. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351-52
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding Iran responsible for corporation over which it exercised
control); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 IRAN-U.S. CL.
TRIB. REP. 228, 241-42 (1987) (holding the same); Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain
(Rectification and Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13, 2000, Jan. 31,
2001) (translation in English) (holding Spain responsible for the acts of its state
entity); Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 39, 58 (Feb. 5, 1970) ("[V]eil lifting.., is
admissible to play... a role in international law.").
53. Proxy triggers will be especially authoritative where a signatory's corporate
form is a sham designed to perpetrate fraud and decision-makers are keen to attach
responsibility for the signatory corporation's acts to the controlling state.
477
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
3. Forum Selection Triggers
Forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements are another
genus of triggers that diminish states' power and authority to
determine investment outcomes. A state's court is usually its safety
net. If other strategies to determine outcomes-such as negotiations
or administrative actions-have failed, state courts deploy their
judicial authority to determine investment outcomes. However,
through forum selection triggers, investors contract that a host state's
judiciary shall not interfere with their investments. These forum
selection triggers effectively neutralize state courts' authority over
investment disputes because national courts and international
tribunals often enforce these clauses.
Forum selection triggers are particularly potent because they do
not require a state's consent or even participation in their negotiation.
Foreign courts and arbitral tribunals tend to respect the express
intentions of contracting parties in arbitration agreements, regardless
of the host state's preferences. 4 In ICC Case No. 5294, a Danish
firm commenced arbitration under an arbitration clause in its
investment contract with an Egyptian firm.55 The Egyptian firm
brought an action in Egyptian courts to declare the clause invalid
because it violated Egyptian law.56 In response, the arbitrator sitting
in Switzerland found that the validity of the arbitration clause under
Egyptian law was immaterial because the clause's validity was
governed by the lex fori, i.e., Switzerland, and that the Egyptian
proceedings accordingly had no effect on the arbitration. 7 Even
though Egypt had a clear sovereign interest in applying its laws to
disputes involving its nationals, the arbitration clause between
54. See Compafiia Minera Condesa SA v. Compafiia de Minas Buenaventura
SA, 13-9 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. C-i, C-6 (German Fed. Ct., Civ. Div., Dec.
19, 1997) (noting that state courts must generally send parties to arbitration if an
arbitration agreement exists); ICC Case No. 1512 (1970) (Second Preliminary
Award), in. SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1974-85 37, 38 (1990) (disagreeing with the defendant's view that host
state courts may not have their jurisdiction ousted).
55. ICC Case No. 5294 (Feb. 22, 1988), in SIGVARD JARVIN ET AL.,
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-1990 180 (1984).
56. Id. at 183.
57. Id.
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private parties effectively triggered the transfer of power and
authority of Egypt's courts to the arbitral tribunal.58
Forum selection triggers can even exclude a host state's judicial
authority over disputes involving local investors. Although a state's
relationships with its nationals are classically regarded as an internal
sovereign matter, the policy of promoting and protecting investments
has increasingly taken precedence over sovereignty over nationals.
Investors have signaled that international law should exert control
over state actions relating to domestic concessionaires by stipulating
in investment agreements that domestic concessionaires shall be
deemed to be foreign investors. In response to investors' signals,
tribunals have accepted investors' recommendation and exercised
jurisdiction over such domestic concessionaires.
In Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela (Jurisdiction), the domestic concessionaire
was registered in Venezuela.59 The investment agreement provided
that the concessionaire was to be considered an investor under
foreign control for the purposes of establishing International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") jurisdiction if the
majority of the concessionaire's shares were held by a foreign
national from an ICSID state.' The tribunal accepted this definition
of "foreign control," stating that the parties were free to agree on a
reasonable meaning of foreign control under the ICSID
Convention.61 The tribunal concluded that ICSID, and not the
Venezuelan courts, had jurisdiction over the dispute because the
58. Id. at 184 ("Egyptian Courts would not have jurisdiction of either these
proceedings or the arbitrator.").
59. Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, slip op. 9 (Sept. 27, 2001),
(stating that the Venezuela registered company was incorporated to serve as the
concessionaire for the project), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
decjuris.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
60. Concession Agreement between Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela,
C.A. and Repfiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela, cls. 63-64, cited in id. 78-79.
61. See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. (Jurisdiction), slip op.
64 (stating that parties' definition of control is reasonable because it used the
traditional share ownership test in determining control).
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majority of the concessionaire's shares had come to be held by a U.S.
corporation.62
This ICSID award shows how a forum selection trigger can erode
a state's judicial control over its local corporations. First, states
consent to the ICSID Convention, which provides at Article 25 that
ICSID shall have jurisdiction over investment disputes if the parties
submitted to ICSID's jurisdiction in writing and agreed that a
domestic investor shall be considered a foreign national because of
foreign control, "as long as the definition of foreign control chosen
by the parties is reasonable and the purposes of the Convention have
not been abused. '63 Domestic investors then agree with their
investment partners that the domestic investors shall be deemed to be
foreign investors if mutually agreed-upon criteria for foreign control
are met. Once the domestic investor meets the requirements for
foreign control, the power and authority of the host state's courts
over the investment project is effectively neutralized by the forum
selection triggers in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and the
investment agreements. 64
Some decision-makers have proposed to make forum selection
triggers even more potent by supplementing these triggers' authority
with Most Favored Nation ("MFN") clauses.65 MFN clauses may be
found in contracts or treaties.6 6 An MFM clause obliges parties to
62. See id. 77-142.
63. Id. 116.
64. See Tokios Tokelrs v. Ukraine (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18
(Apr. 29. 2004) (asserting ICSID jurisdiction in a dispute between Ukraine and a
Lithuanian corporation that was controlled and 99% owned by Ukrainian
nationals), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tokios-decision.
pdf (last visited, Mar. 1, 2005). But see id., dissenting opinion of Chairman Prosper
Weil, slip op. 5-6 (arguing that ICSID arbitration was intended only for
international disputes between a state and foreign investors), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tokios-dissenting-opinion.pdf (last visited,
Mar. 1, 2005).
65. See, e.g., Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (Jurisdiction),
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, slip op. 183 (Feb. 8, 2005) (noting claimant's
contention that Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT's Most Favored Nation ("MFN") provision
covers dispute settlement provisions in other BITs).
66. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and
the Government of the Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Nov. 23, 1995, art. 4 (on file with author) (providing MFN
treatment).
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treat each other no less favorably than they treat third parties. Some
investors have argued, and some tribunals have accepted, that an
MFN clause in an international agreement can import a forum
selection trigger that is more favorable to investors into that
investment agreement. 67 However, because forum selection triggers
have such a strong neutralizing effect on the authority of municipal
courts, host states and some tribunals have been reluctant to extend
the reach of forum selection triggers through MFN clauses. 68 The
current equilibrium between these two positions appears to be that an
MFN clause may augment forum selection triggers only if it clearly
refers to such triggers,69 such as by expressly stating that it applies to
dispute resolution.70
B. DRAINING STATE POWER AND AUTHORITY
Once triggers have been sprung, international investment law
swiftly erodes state power and authority from all three branches of
government. Classical international law conceived of states as the
most basic legal persons. Under this view, power and authority
resided in the state as an indivisible and opaque entity. Behind the
sovereign veil, however, power and authority reside in each of the
state's decision-makers, such as the three branches of government
67. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7, slip op. 38-64 (Jan. 25, 2000) (translation in English) (finding that
the Argentina-Spain BIT MFN clause imported the Chile-Spain BIT forum
selection trigger).
68. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
(Jurisdiction), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, slip op. 119 (Nov. 15, 2004) (finding
that investment agreement's MFN clause did not apply to dispute settlement
clauses); Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (Jurisdiction), ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/04, slip op. 198-99 (Feb. 8, 2005) (finding that BIT's MFN
clause did not apply to dispute settlement provisions).
69. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (Jurisdiction), ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/04, slip op. 223 (Feb. 8, 2005) ("[A]n MFN provision in a
basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions in
whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic
treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.").
70. Compare id. 204 (citing example of UK model BIT's MFN clause
expressly providing that the clause applies to article 1 to 11 of the BIT, which
includes the dispute settlement provisions in articles 8 and 9), with id. 205
(noting that an MFN clause providing that it applies "with respect to all matters"
does not "alleviate the doubt" about whether it applies to dispute settlement).
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and their sub-divisions. A state's international acts result from the
complex interactions of these decision-makers.
International investment law diminishes the authority and power
of a state by restraining its internal decision-makers. Ironically,
international law exerts control over internal decision-makers
precisely because international law does not recognize them as legal
persons. By not distinguishing between states and their organs and
instrumentalities, international law holds states responsible for the
acts of their branches of government.7' Consequently, although
international investment law's demands for compliance are formally
addressed to states, these demands pressurize internal decision-
makers to avoid incurring state responsibility for their acts.
1. Executive Power and Authority
States commonly interact with foreign investors through their
executive branch's agencies or instrumentalities. Government
departments conclude contracts with investors and administrative
agencies monitor joint venture companies' compliance with local
regulations. The executive branch's power and authority is, however,
diminished by international investment law, which demands that the
host state respect the legitimate expectations of investors.
A recent dispute with the Czech Republic demonstrates
international investment law's profound effect on executive power
and authority. After the Czech Republic's succession in 1993, its
Media Council granted a broadcasting license to CET 21, a Czech
company, and allowed direct investments in CET 21 by CEDC, a
foreign-owned company in which Robert Lauder, a former U.S.
71. See Estate of Pellat (France) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 534, 536
(June 7, 1929); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Merits), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 515 (June
27) (finding that the United States was responsible for the acts of its executive
branch); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)(Merits), slip op., 106-114 (I.C.J. Mar. 31, 2004) (expressing the same),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004).
72. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Partial Award), slip op.
(UNCITRAL, Sept. 13, 2001) (detailing investment dispute between Czech
Republic and Netherlands investor), available at
http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/PartialAward.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2004).
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ambassador to the Czech Republic, had interests.73 Subsequently, the
Media Council changed its policies and instead approved the creation
of CNTS, a joint investment vehicle owned by the Czech Savings
Bank, CEDC and CET 21. CET 21 passed its exclusive right to use
the media license to CNTS, which used this right to operate a
broadcasting station called "TV Nova.
75
Over time, the fledgling Czech government exerted more
regulatory control over its media.76 Concurrently, CET 21 was trying
to revoke CNTS' exclusive use of its license so that it could sell the
use of its license to additional providers.77 Upon CET 21's request
for advice on the media law, the Media Council issued a letter stating
that business "relations between the operator of broadcasting and its
service must be established on a non-exclusive basis. 78 CET 21
relied on this letter to negotiate with CNTS to end their exclusive
broadcasting arrangement. When negotiations failed, CET 21
withdrew from the investment and began broadcasting through
another company.79 The foreign investors then orchestrated
numerous litigations and arbitrations to recover their losses,
including an action by Mr. Lauder in his own name,80 and an action
by CME Czech Republic B.V., the Lauder-controlled Netherlands
successor to CEDC.81
In CME Czech Republic B. V. v. Czech Republic (Partial Award),
the tribunal found that the Council's regulatory actions violated the
73. CME Czech Republic B.V. (Partial Award), slip op. 7.
74. Id. ll.
75. Id. 12.
76. Id. 15-16.
77. Id. 119.
78. CME Czech Republic B.V. (Partial Award), slip op. 128.
79. Id. 131.
80. See Lauder v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op. 11 (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 3, 2001) (stating that Lauder commenced the proceedings against the Czech
Republic to "restore the contractual and legal rights associated with [his]
investments"), available at http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/FinalAward.doc
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
81. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Partial Award), slip op. 2 (noting that the
arbitration proceedings began on February 22, 2000).
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Czech-Netherlands BIT.82 The tribunal stated that the Czech
Republic was responsible for CME's losses that flowed from the
ultimate collapse of CNTS when CET 21 withdrew from the
investment. 3 According to the tribunal, the Media Council
emboldened CET 21 by issuing its opinion that the use of the license
by CNTS was non-exclusive and by remaining silent when CET 21
eliminated CNTS as the exclusive service provider.' It was
immaterial that the immediate and operative cause of CME's losses
was not the Media Council's actions, but the independent local
investor's withdrawal from the investment. Whereas international
investment law has long prohibited states from directly interfering
with the foreign investments in breach of international norms,8 6 the
CME award indicates that international law has become sufficiently
authoritative to prohibit states from even indirectly influencing
investment outcomes through regulatory opinions.8 7
82. Id. 609-18.
83. Id. 615.
84. Id. 554, 558, 574.
85. Id. 559.
86. See Case Concerning Factory at Chorz6w (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits),
P.C.I.J. Ser. A. No. 13 (Sept. 13, 1928) (finding Poland responsible for reparation
for damage caused to German companies by taking possession of the companies'
factory); Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 309-129-3 (July 2, 1987)
15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 23, 31-33 (1988) (holding Iran responsible for taking
possession of foreign investor's oil rigs); Asian Agricultural Prods. Ltd. (AAPL) v.
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, slip op., 86 (June 21, 1990)
(holding Sri Lanka responsible for its military forces' destruction of foreign
investor's farm).
87. See Himpuma California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Interim
Award), 15-1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-I, A-29-A-34 (2000) (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 26, 1999) (finding Indonesia responsible for failing to prevent its local
investor from obtaining an injunction against Indonesia's participation in the
arbitration between Indonesia and a foreign investor). But see Olguin v. Republic
of Paraguay (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, slip op. 84 (July 26, 2001)
(translation in English) ("[O]missions, however egregious they may be, are not
sufficient for [expropriation] to take place."), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/Olgun-award-en.pdf (last visited Dec. 30,
2004).
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2. Legislative Power and Authority
A state's international obligations to protect foreign investments
constrain its legislative power and authority because international
law holds states responsible for their legislative acts. In Ethyl Corp.
v. Gov't of Canada,89 U.S. corporation Ethyl Corporation filed a
North American Free Trade Act ("NAFTA") claim against Canada
for enacting legislation that affected Ethyl's investment in Canada.
The Canadian Parliament had enacted the 1997 Manganese-based
Fuel Additives Act.90 This Act banned the importation and inter-state
transportation of methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl
("MMT"), a fuel additive designed to boost octane levels in
gasoline.9 Ethyl had been unsuccessful in selling MMT in the United
States because the Environmental Protection Agency had delayed
approval for MMT until 1995 due to concerns that MMT caused
emission control devices to fail and led to neurological disorders and
respiratory problems.9 Ethyl had instead been exporting MMT to
Canada. The Canadian ban thus had a potentially huge impact on
Ethyl's revenues.
After the NAFTA tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over some
of Ethyl's claims,93 Canada was pressured into settling Ethyl's claims
88. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/56/10,
ch. W.E.1 (2001) ("[T]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of
that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions . . ... "); Commentaries to the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR
Int'l L. Comm'n., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 86, n.113, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch.
IV.E.2 (2001), (citing cases on state responsibility for legislative acts).
89. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (Jurisdiction), 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999) (UNCITRAL, June
24, 1998).
90. See id. at 714.
91. See David Wesley, Ethyl Corporation of Virginia: The MMT Battle in Canada,
Ivey School of Business, University of W. Ontario, Ivey Doc. No. 902M48 (2001), at 2
(describing Canadian ban on MMT).
92. See id. at 4-5 (describing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
objections to MMT). By the time MMT was approved in the United States, U.S.
refiners had invested in other lead substitutes. Id. at 1.
93. Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 730 (finding jurisdiction over some of Ethyl's
claims).
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within six months.94 Under this settlement, Canada agreed to allow
Ethyl to resume selling MMT in Canada, paid Ethyl $13 million in
compensation, issued a public apology and conceded that MMT was
not harmful. 95
Whereas the Canadian government had full legislative authority
and power to regulate the distribution of petrochemicals by Canadian
corporations according to Canada's environmental and public health
policies, international law constrained Canada's legislative power
over foreign investors. NAFTA had sufficiently consolidated
expectations on appropriate international investment behavior and
provided a sufficiently authoritative means of enforcement by
binding arbitration that Canada was pressured into complying with
the investment demands of a foreign investor, Ethyl.96 In this manner,
international law drained Canada's legislative authority over foreign
investors without even issuing a final award in the Ethyl dispute.
Although states retain some legislative power and authority over
foreign investments, the exercise of this power and authority often
attracts international consequences, which can effectively impede the
fully autonomous exercise of legislative power and authority.97
94. See Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of its Kind and a Harbinger
of Things to Come, 11 AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 187, n.22 (2000) (noting that
Canada settled the dispute in the same year as the NAFTA tribunal's decision on
jurisdiction); Adam Sulkowski, NAFTA's Indirect Expropriation Protections: Will
Compensation Be Required When Ecological Protections Are Applied? (an
Analysis of Metalclad Corporation's Claims Against Mexico), 15-2 MEALEY'S
INTL. ARB. REP. 23, 29 (Feb. 2000) ("Ethyl's case never reached final
arbitration.").
95. See id. (describing settlement terms); Friends of the Earth International,
Trade Case Study: Ethyl Corp and MMT (stating settlement terms), at
http://foei.org/trade/activistguide/ethyl.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
96. See Sulkowski, supra note 94, at 29 ("Ethyl's case demonstrated that these
claims for damages may present enough of a threat that governments will prefer
settlement to full arbitration.").
97. See Lawrence Herman, MMT & Ethyl Case-Trade Lawyer Expresses
Concern!, THE FIN. POST (Can.), Jul. 28, 1998, at 1 ("The [Ethyl] case has thus
emerged as one of the most important in the annals of Canadian trade law. Even
though it settled out of court, it has established a far-reaching precedent."),
available at http://www.canadianliberty.bc.ca/relatedinfo/ethylconcem.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2005); see also Methanex Corp. v. United States, Claimant's Reply
to Statement of Defense (UNCITRAL Aug. 28, 2000), slip op., 26, 38 (bringing
a claim against the United States founded on, inter alia, the California legislature's
acts). As of January 1, 2005, the tribunal has not issued a decision on the merits of
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3. Judicial Power and Authority
International investment law also limits judicial power and
authority. Although most constitutions stipulate that the judicial
branch is the final decision-maker in legal disputes, a judiciary's
power and authority can be severely constrained by international
investment law. International investment law prohibits national
courts from deciding investment disputes in a way that would deny
investors justice. Judicial decisions that have effectively eviscerated
the value of investments or that have abrogated investor protections
have also been found to violate international law.9" Indeed, investors
may bring international law claims even where the executive or
legislative branch has expropriated their investments and national
courts have failed to remedy the expropriation fully.99
Forum selection triggers have also neutralized courts' authority to
control the outcomes of investment disputes, even though courts
from both developed and developing states have favored judicial
control over investment disputes when fundamental national interests
are implicated. 100 Although investors do not have the authority on
their own to exclude the courts through their investment contracts,
these contractual triggers are authoritative when foreign courts and
this arbitration. See U.S. Dep't of State, "Methanex Corp. v. United States of
America," at http://www.state.gov/s/1/c5818.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
98. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Resubmitted Case, Award,
Supplemental Decision and Rectification), ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID
(W. Bank) 569 136-37, 146-52 (May 31, 1990, Oct. 10. 1991) (finding
Indonesia responsible for judicial decisions that effectively expropriated foreign
investor's investment); Azinian v. United Mexican States (Award), ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/2, slip op. 98 (Nov. 1, 1999) (quoting former ICJ President
Eduardo Jim~mez de Archaga's analysis that a state is responsible for the acts of
its courts).
99. See GAMI Invs., Inc. v. Gov't of the United Mexican States (Final Award),
slip op., 38(B) (UNCITRAL, Nov. 15, 2004) (stating that an investor may bring a
claim where "the expropriation is rescinded by the national courts but the ...
investor remains unsatisfied").
100. See Peter Cornell & Arwen Handley, Himpurna and Hub: International
Arbitration in Developing Countries, 15-9 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (2000)
(discussing a Pakistani court's refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement where
the dispute involved findings about criminality); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding an order to compel an
arbitration that implicated U.S. antitrust policies, but reserving the right at
enforcement proceedings to review the award for consistency with these policies).
487
488 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. [20:465
tribunals support them. These courts and tribunals, through anti-suit
injunctions against the litigant pursuing an action in the host state's
courts, signal to the host state's courts not to exercise their powers in
relation to the investment dispute.'0' When these international law
claims are accompanied by threatened or actual enforcement actions,
such as contempt orders for non-compliance with injunctions,10 2 the
litigant may be forced to terminate its suit in the host state's courts,
thereby also foreclosing the host state's opportunity to exercise its
adjudicatory powers.
However, state courts do not always comply with international
law's signals against the exercise of their powers. The anti-suit
strategy fails if foreign courts decline to issue anti-suit injunctions. 03
Even if anti-suit injunctions are obtained, the host state's courts may
101. See Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Medical Sys. Info.
Technologies, Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 652-55 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A]n anti-suit injunction
against parallel litigation may be imposed."); Newbridge Acquisition I, L.L.C. v.
Grupo Corvi, S.A. De D.V., No. 02-9839, 2003 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW 42007, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003) (enjoining litigation in Mexican courts in support of a
broad arbitration provision); Capital India Power Mauritius I v. Overseas Private
Inv. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 7394, slip op. (S.D.N.Y Sept. 26, 2003) (issuing
preliminary injunction against Indian court proceedings that were parallel to an
ICC arbitration); Capital India Power Mauritius I v. Maharashtra Power Dev.
Corp., No. 03 Civ. 7394, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2003) (granting order to
compel arbitration); Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v. Pagnan SpA,
[1995] 1 Lloyds Rep. 87 (Eng. C.A.) (upholding anti-suit injunction against Italian
court proceedings on basis of arbitration agreement); Pena Copper Mines Ltd. v.
Rio Tino Co. Ltd., (1911) 105 L.T. 846 (Eng. C.A.) (holding anti-suit injunction
available against foreign proceedings in breach of arbitration agreement).
102. See Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda., 369 F.3d at 655-58
(upholding contempt order for failure to comply with anti-suit injunction); Capital
India Power Mauritius I v. Maharashtra Power Dev. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 7394, slip
op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003) (issuing contempt order for failure to comply with
preliminary injunction against Indian court proceedings).
103. See Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel [1998] 2 All E.R. 257 (H.L. 1998)
(denying anti-suit injunction); Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d
1349, 1354-58 (6th Cir. 1992) (overruling the district court's issuance of an anti-
suit injunction); see generally Hans van Houtte, Parallel Proceedings Before State
Courts and Arbitration Tribunals--Is there a Transnational Lis Alibi Pendens-
Exception in Arbitration or Jurisdiction Conventions?, in ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS OR
STATE COURTS, WHO MUST DEFER TO WHOM?, ASA Special Series No. 15 35 (Pierre
A. Karrer, ed. 2001) (arguing that some international conventions allow courts to
refuse jurisdiction over disputes which are within arbitrator's jurisdiction).
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have exercised their adjudicatory powers prior to the injunctions. 104
Alternatively, the anti-suit injunction and contempt orders may be
ignored by the litigant to whom these orders are addressed if this
litigant is willing to incur the costs of contempt or if the litigant does
not have assets in the forum. 0 5 In these situations, the national courts
can continue to exert jurisdiction over investors.
International law's authoritative response to the host state's courts'
actions in spite of forum selection triggers is similar to its response to
judicial actions that eviscerate investments. The international tribunal
claiming competence to determine the investment dispute can refuse
to give legal effect to, or comply with, the decisions of the host
state's courts.10 6 International tribunals may also award damages
against the host state to compensate the investor for loses flowing
from the host state's courts' decisions. 0 7
104. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that U.S. court's
temporary restraining order against annulment proceedings which had begun in
Indonesia did not prevent Indonesia's courts from enjoining award's enforcement).
105. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C., 335 F.3d at 363 (noting that Indonesian
investment party elected to ignore U.S. anti-suit temporary restraining order);
Capital India Power Mauritius I v. Maharashtra Power Dev. Corp., No. 03 Civ.
7394, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003) (noting Indian party's refusal to comply
with preliminary injunction against Indian court proceedings).
106. See Compafiia Minera Condesa SA v. Compaflia de Minas Buenaventura
SA, 13-9 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. C-I, C-6 (German Fed. Ct., Civ. Div., Dec.
19, 1997) (rejecting the home state court's opinion); ICC Case No. 1512 (Second
Preliminary Award) (Jan. 14, 1970), in SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS,
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-85 37, 38 (1990) ("The ICC rules
themselves.., leave no room for applying the law of one or the other party.").
107. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Interim
Award), 15-1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-I, A-28 et seq. (2000) (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 26, 1999) (finding Indonesia responsible for its court's decisions); Himpurna
California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Final Award), 15-2 MEALEY'S
INT'L ARB. REP. A-1 (1999) (UNCITRAL, Oct. 16, 1999) (awarding damages
against Indonesia for its court's decisions); STEPHEN SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 103-04 (1987) ("Dr. F.V. Garcia
Amador .... Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility, maintains that... 'non-fulfillment of the arbitration clause would
directly give rise to the international responsibility of the State.').
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Municipal courts may enforce these awards, 0 8 and may bolster
their authority by relying on foreign courts' jurisprudence." 9 This
cross-pollination of juridical ideas stabilizes international investment
law when it coordinates judicial strategies to support international
norms in present and future investment disputes." 0 Through this
process of signaling and responding between different decision-
makers, international law neutralizes the power and authority of the
host state's judiciary over investments.
Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE, SA v. Government of the Republic
of Yemen ("CFE") illustrates such a draining of judicial authority by
international investment law."' In 1981, the Yemen Port Authority
of South Yemen entered into a construction contract with Compagnie
Francois d'Enterprises C.F.E., S.A. ("CFE"), for the completion and
maintenance of certain Works of Al-Mukalla Harbor." 2 South
Yemen and CFE subsequently disagreed over a number of
contractual issues and CFE commenced ICC arbitration in Cyprus
against Yemen.II
108. See Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization,
1995 Q.B. 282 (Eng.) (upholding leave to enforce arbitration award in investment
dispute); Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE, S.A. v. Republic of Yemen, 180 F. Supp.
2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2001) (enforcing international arbitral award); CBS Corp. v.
Wak Orient Power & Light Ltd., 168 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411-15 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(confirming arbitral award).
109. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding persuasive Hong
Kong court's jurisprudence on lex arbitri of international arbitration in question).
110. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C., 335 F.3d at 370-71 (noting that Hong Kong
court had enforced arbitral award rendered in Switzerland in spite of Indonesian
court's annulment and likewise finding that annulment should not prevent U.S.
courts from enforcing award); Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 310 (5th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 59 (2004) (affirming summary judgment enforcing arbitral
award in spite of annulment by Indonesian courts and noting that Hong Kong
courts had also enforced award).
111. Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE, SA v. Gov't of the Republic of Yemen
(Final Award), ICC Case No. 7748/BGD/OLG, slip op. (Sept. 26, 1997).
112. Compagnie d'Enterprises, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
113. See id. (tracking the deteriorating relationship between CFE and the Yemen
Port Authority). By the time of the arbitration, North and South Yemen had
merged.
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The interplay between private contract claims, arbitral practice and
public international law caused Yemen to lose judicial power when it
entered into and remained in the international investment
framework.' 14 After the arbitral tribunal issued a partial award
finding that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, Yemen went before
its courts to annul the award and obtain an injunction against the
arbitration. 1 5 Although one of the parties to the contract was Yemeni
and the contract was concluded and performed in Yemen,' 16 the
arbitrator relied on the arbitration agreement to ignore the Yemen
court's proceedings and anti-suit injunction."7 The arbitrator also
reasoned that under the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"),
the proper court to set aside an arbitral award is the court at the situs
of arbitration and no annulment proceeding had been brought in the
Cyprus courts.1' 8
Because of the risk that other courts would recognize and enforce
the arbitrator's award, Yemen abandoned its judicial claim that the
award was a nullity. Instead, Yemen abided by international
114. See id. at 12-13 (describing how, although the contract was governed by
South Yemen laws, the arbitration agreement contained in the contract was
governed by the ICC Rules of Arbitration). The arbitrator referred to Yemen law,
the laws of foreign jurisdictions such as England, Shari'a law, public international
law and the practice of arbitral tribunals. Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE (Final
Award), slip op. at 71, 87, 89, 152, 155-56, 158, 170.
115. Id. at35.
116. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971) §§ 186-88
(stating absent a choice of law provision in the contract, the law of the state with
the most significant contacts governs the contract).
117. See Compafiia Minera Condesa SA v. Compaiiia de Minas Buenaventura
SA, 13-9 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. C-I, C-6 (German Fed. Ct., Civ. Div., Dec.
19, 1997) (displacing state court's jurisdiction in favor of arbitration based on
arbitration agreement); see generally SCHWEBEL, supra note 107, at 61-143
(discussing international law requirement to comply with an arbitration
agreement).
118. See Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE (Final Award), slip op. at 64
(discussing enforcement of arbitration agreements); ICC Case No. 1512 (Second
Preliminary Award) (1970), in SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS, COLLECTION OF
ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-85 37, 38 (1990) (finding Pakistani courts lack
jurisdiction over arbitration); ICC Case No. 5294 (1988), in SIGVARD JARVIN ET
AL., COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-1990 180, 184 (1984)
("Egyptian courts would not have jurisdiction of either these proceedings or the
arbitrator.").
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investment law's decision-making process and sought annulment in
Cyprus courts. Cyprus courts, however, supported the ICC tribunal
by finding that the arbitration agreement had properly transferred
judicial power and authority from the Yemen courts to the ICC
tribunal and Cyprus courts, and by upholding the arbitral tribunal's
decision. 119 Through this collusion of tribunals, investors and courts,
international investment law wrested from Yemen its judicial
authority over investment disputes in its territory.
C. TRANSFERRING POWER AND AUTHORITY TO OTHER DECISION-
MAKERS
The power and authority that international investment law drains
from states does not vaporize, and is often transferred to a wide
range of decision-makers, including investors, foreign courts,
international tribunals, foreign governments, the media, local
investors and international organizations. Among these transferees,
the greatest beneficiaries are foreign and international tribunals and
investors.
When forum selection triggers drain a state's judicial power, this
power is transferred to foreign courts and tribunals selected by
investment parties. In the CFE dispute, the accrual of authority and
power over the investment dispute by the ICC arbitral tribunal and
the foreign court at the site of the arbitration corresponded to the
erosion of Yemen's jurisdiction over the dispute. Cyprus courts and
the ICC tribunal were able to demand compliance with the tribunal's
award, thereby confirming Yemen's liability for contract breaches.
International investment law also transfers power and authority
from states to investors. Multinational corporations can be more
powerful than the states in which they invest, 120 and may be able to
119. See General Application No. 35/98 (Nicosia Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1999)
(unofficial translation in English by G. Cacoyannis) (copy on file with author)
(dismissing Yemen's application to set aside the tribunal's ruling); see also $32.5
Million ICC Award Stands, Nicosia Supreme Court Rules, 17-10 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 2 (2002) (noting Cyprus court's rejection of Yemen's request to set
aside CFE award).
120. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (separate
opinion of Ian Brownlie), slip op. 76 (UNCITRAL, March 14, 2003), available
at http://www.cetv-net.com/iFiles/1439-seperate-op-pdf-1403.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2005) ("It is, of course, a truism to point out that multinationals may be more
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impose imbalanced bargains.121 Even before the ink is dry on
investment contracts with such corporations, states lose some
authority and power to correct any imbalances. International
investment law transfers this power and authority to investors,
which, understandably, seek to enforce their bargains, whether fair or
not, against the host state. When these investors are successful, huge
burdens may be placed on states' financial resources.
22
Beyond control over states' resources, investors also gain control
over a range of sovereign concerns because investments are not made
in a vacuum. Investments are made by transforming capital and other
inputs into outputs, such as electricity, 2 3 fuel, 124 tourist resorts,
125
banking services 126 and military hardware. 127 These outputs are often
powerful than small states.").
121. See Can Dahbol be Fired up Again?, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004 (describing
the 1990s as a time "when foreign power firms swept across Asia, persuading
eager politicians and bureaucrats to let them set up generating plants at inflated
prices"); ABHAY MEHTA, POWER PLAY: A STUDY OF THE ENRON PROJECT 147
(2000) (citing the Indian government's complaint that Enron had bribed officials to
enter into a power plant project); Amnesty International, The "Enron Project" in
Maharashtra, ASA/20/031/1987 (July 17, 1997) (noting allegations that, in an
Enron power project in India, Enron bribed local officials to secure investment
terms grossly unfair to India), available at http://www.amnestyusa.
org/countries/india/document.do?id=73E2D8C20C9F 126F8025690000693813
(last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
122. See CME Czech Republic B. V. (Final Award) (separate opinion of Ian
Brownlie), slip op. 77-78 (noting concern that arbitral awards can have
"catastrophic repercussions on the livelihood and economic well-being of the
population of the state against whom an action is brought").
123. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Interim
Award), 15-1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, at A-1 (2000) (UNCITRAL, Sept. 26
1999) (describing Indonesian power project).
124. See Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) (Award), 66 INT'L
L. REPORTS 519 (Mar. 24, 1982) (concerning agreement to sell petroleum and
related resources); Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (Award), 15 IRAN-U.S.
CL. TRIB. REP. 23 (July 2, 1987) (concerning lease and operation of drilling rigs in
Iran).
125. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 186, 200 (ICSID,
May 20. 1992) (describing foreign investment in a resort complex near the
Pyramids); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Award), ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002) (Dec. 8, 2002) (discussing international hotel
investments in Egypt).
126. See Genin v. Republic of Estonia (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, slip
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directly linked with key sovereign concerns, such as infrastructure,
tourism, international trade and defense. By constraining the power
and authority of the legislature, executive and judiciary, international
investment law restricts the state's ability to protect these sovereign
concerns, and correspondingly, increases investors' power over these
sovereign matters.
The CME dispute shows how international investment law
transfers a state's power and authority over a key sovereign concern
to an investor. By entering into the web of investment arrangements,
including the Netherlands-Czech BIT, and actively seeking foreign
investors to develop its media industry, the Czech Republic lost
important control of its media,'28 which is a powerful tool for
disseminating information and influencing public opinion. The
Czech Republic's loss of media control was accompanied by an
increase in the media power of CNTS, and CME as shareholder.
Local investors were unable to compete successfully against CNTS
and its foreign shareholders,129 and TV Nova dominated the media
industry. 30 With this market domination, CME could control, albeit
incompletely, information and analysis on domestic and world
events, thereby influencing public opinion to suit CME's and its
shareholders' agendas. 3'
op. 1-3 (June 25, 2001) (resolving a dispute between Estonia and investors in
Estonian Innovation Bank, a financial institution), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/genin.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
127. See Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization,
1995 Q.B. 282 (Eng.) (discussing an international investment for the production
and the sale of military equipment).
128. See Lauder v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op. 229 (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 3, 2001) (explaining that the Czech Media Council's attempts to separate
owners from license-holders were. motivated out of "fear that a majority share of
foreign capital in the license holder's Company might impact the independence of
full-format broadcasts" (emphasis in original)).
129. See id. TT 74-99 (outlining how CNTS gradually took market shares from
local investors).
130. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op.
109-12 (UNCITRAL, Mar. 14, 2003) (describing TV Nova's market
dominance); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Partial Award), slip
op. 458 (UNCITRAL, Sept. 13, 2001) (acknowledging that after just one year in
business, TV NOVA "became the most successful and profitable private television
station in the Czech Republic").
131. See East European Constitutional Review, 9 CONSTITUTION WATCH, Nos.
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An international investments' impact on political independence
and security is magnified when one considers that some key political
figures in powerful states have close ties to multinational
corporations, such as Vice President Dick Cheney's relationship with
Halliburton,'32 and that powerful states have repeatedly demonstrated
their willingness to dabble in the local politics of weaker states,'33
such as the Reagan administration's support of Nicaraguan rebels. 3
4
In powerful states, political leaders with close connections to
multinational corporations can pursue foreign policies through
investment projects.'35 Investment projects can be used openly and
benignly, such as by exchanging investment capital for open trade
policies or military bases, or they can be used covertly and
subversively. When media controls have been transferred to foreign
controlled corporations, careful broadcast programming can
influence political outcomes. When judicial controls have been
transferred to foreign courts or tribunals through arbitration
agreements and forum selection clauses, foreign governments may
attempt to influence these courts to hand down decisions that protect
their interests, 136 and judges may represent the values of their
political and cultural systems. 13 7
1/2 (2000) ("The station's popularity makes it significant from both economic and
political perspectives."), available at http://law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9numonehalf/
constitutionwatch/czech.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
132. See Joshua Chaffin, Cheney's Office 'Briefed on Pentagon Deal,' FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 4 (speculating that Halliburton won contracts with Iraq
because of Vice President Cheney's relationship with the corporation).
133. See Reisman, supra note 11, at 516 ("States have long meddled in the
politics of other states ... whether impelled by revolutionary political, racial, or
religious ideology; fear; or sheer lust for power.").
134. See generally Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27) (considering
the Reagan administration's alleged ties to the Nicaraguan guerilla movement).
135. See SHERIF SEID, GLOBAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
21 (2002) ("[F]oreign investors are to some extent within the jurisdiction and
influence of a comparatively powerful foreign government.").
136. See, e.g., Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Final
Award), 15-2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-I, A-2, 19 (2000) (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 26 1999) (noting that Indonesia tried to influence its party-appointed
arbitrator by attempting to make exparte contact on several occasions).
137. Cf SCHACHTER, supra note 10, 43 ("[I]ndividual judges are, by and large,
influenced by the views of their own governments.").
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D. RESTORING POWER AND AUTHORITY TO STATES
Although a state can lose control over important sovereign matters
by entering into the international investment framework, this control
can be regained, albeit at a price. Where executive and legislative
power and authority has been transferred to investors, this power and
authority can be restored by expropriating the investment and
compensating the investor for its loses. In Southern Pacific
Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt (Award)
("SPP"), in the face of imminent destruction of its antiquities, Egypt
chose to protect its antiquities by repurchasing its power and
authority from investors. The direct financial cost was $27 million,
the amount of the SPP award. 38
The price to repurchase power and authority from investors can be
tremendous. In CME Czech Republic B. V. (Final Award), the price to
repurchase Czech power and authority was $270 million, or about 10
billion Czech Kuronas. 139 In contrast to the SPP dispute, in which
Egypt was only made to compensate the Hong Kong investor for its
actual investment, the CME tribunal awarded far more than the
investor's actual investment.
The CME tribunal calculated the cost of restoring sovereignty by
analyzing CNTS' discounted cash flow, 40  which involved
forecasting cash-flows "to infinity" and then discounting this figure
to account for certain risks.' 4' The discounted cash flow method
138. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt
(Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 189, 248 (ICSID, May
20, 1992) (awarding $27,661,000).
139. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op.
at 163 (UNCITRAL, March 14, 2003) (ordering Czech Republic to pay
$269,814,000 to CME); see also Daniela Lazarova, Parliament Votes to Dissolve
TV and Radio Council, CESKI ROZHLAS, Mar. 4, 2003 (noting that Czech
Republic's loss in the arbitration would cost the country over 10 billion Kuronas),
available at http://radio.cz/en/article/39293 (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
140. See CME Czech Republic B. V. (Final Award), slip op. 563-620
(discussing the application of the discounted cash flow method to determine
investment value).
141. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (separate
opinion of Ian Brownlie), slip op. 98 (noting that claimant's valuation method
calculated "the net present value of [CNTS'] future cash earnings stream taken out
to infinity"); see CME Czech Republic B. V (Final Award), 572 (describing
valuation by forecasting "in perpetuity").
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ensured that the investors were awarded not just the value of their
actual investments and reasonably certain profits, but also
speculative profits, because the longer one projects income into the
future, the more uncertain this projection necessarily becomes. 42 The
tribunal was comfortable awarding future profits "by a rough
assessment," when there were neither "hard facts" or "plausible
arguments for . . . expectations," but only "extrapolations of the
CME Management Net Revenues Forecasts.' 1 43 The tribunal's
willingness to award profits based on such tenuous evidence stands
in contrast to Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, which refused to award compensation for the
earning capacity of an expropriated license in the absence of "proof
of concrete contracts missed and of the profits lost from them,"'"
and flies in the face of the well-established international law
principle that speculative losses are not recoverable. 45
142. See CME Czech Republic B. V. (Final Award) (separate opinion of Ian
Brownlie) slip op. 7 100 (noting that discounted cash flow analysis does not
exclude speculative future profits); see also Louis T. Wells, Double Dipping in
Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions Damages Awarded to Karaha Bodas
Company in Indonesia, 19-4 ARB. INT'L 471, 474 (2003) ("[Pjrojecting the stream
of earnings for 30 years requires some heroic assumptions.").
143. CME Czech Republic B. V (Final Award), slip op. $$ 595-96.
144. Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt
(Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, slip op. 127-28 (Apr. 12, 2002), available
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/me cement-award.pdf (last visited Nov.
18, 2004); cf Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Resubmitted Case,
Award, Supplemental Decision and Rectification), ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1
ICSID (W. Bank) 569, 614-617, $$ 186, 196 (May 31, 1990, Oct. 10. 1991)
(awarding profits stipulated by Profit-Sharing Agreement); Agip SpA v. Gov't of
the People's Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/1, 1 ICSID (W.
Bank) 306, 327, 106 (1993) (Nov. 30, 1979) (awarding profits because the
Assistance Agreement provided that AGIP would receive 1% of total sales);
Benvenuti & Bonfant SRL v. Gov't of the People's Rep. of Congo (Award), ICSID
Case No. ARB/77/2, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 330, 357-58 (Aug. 15, 1980) (translation
in English) (awarding profits for only five years of earnings as provided for by the
relevant Agreement).
145. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF/97/1, 119 INT'L L. REPORTS 616, 121-22 (Aug. 30, 2000) (stating that
awards based on speculative profit predictions are inappropriate); Phelps Dodge
Corp v. Iran, 10 IRAN-US CL. TRIB. REP. 121, $$ 24-31 (1986) (recognizing that
speculative nature of future profits and awarding claimant only actual value of
investment); Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. (Award), slip op.
128-29 (refusing to compensate future profits).
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The financial costs of restoring sovereignty are not the only costs.
The Czech Republic's attempts to assert regulatory control incurred
political, diplomatic and economic costs. Politically, the CME
arbitrations divided the Czech Parliament. Politicians apportioned
blame and eventually dissolved the Media Council by a
parliamentary vote. 4 6 Diplomatic costs were incurred when former
Ambassador Lauder persuaded his government to apply pressure on
the Czech government. 147 Economic costs were imposed on the
Czech Republic when Mr. Lauder placed full page advertisements in
the New York Times and Washington Post, warning potential
investors against doing business in the Czech Republic. 48
Even if a state is willing to incur high financial and non-financial
costs to regain its power and authority, there are instances where a
state cannot repurchase its power and authority, such as where
judicial authority has been transferred to foreign courts and tribunals.
In the CFE, CME and SPP disputes, no amount of money paid to the
arbitral tribunals or foreign courts would have led them to return
jurisdiction to the host state's courts. 14 9
States do, however, have options to regain their judicial power and
authority. Arbitral tribunals' and foreign courts' power and authority
over an investment dispute vaporize upon the final conclusion of the
146. See Lazarova, supra note 139 (noting that the CME dispute divided the
Czech parliament).
147. See East European Constitutional Review, supra note 131 (noting that U.S.
congressmen Tom Lantos and Benjamin Gilman wrote to Czech Prime Minister
Zeman on Mr. Lauder's behalf and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright raised
the issue with Prime Minister Zeman during his United States visit in November
2000); Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Interim
Award), 15-1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-I, A-10, 79 (2000) (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 26, 1999) (acknowledging that an investment dispute between Indonesia and
a U.S. energy corporation involved "directly, or indirectly, bilateral relations
between two important countries"); ABHAY MEHTA, POWER PLAY: A STUDY OF
THE ENRON PROJECT 144-45 (2000) (commenting on the pressure exerted by the
U.S. and UK governments against India's attempts to cancel Enron's energy
investments in India).
148. See East European Constitutional Review, supra note 131 (discussing
Lauder's newspaper advertisements criticizing the Czech Republic).
149. See Compagnie d'Enterprises CFE, S.A. v. Republic of Yemen, 180 F.
Supp. 2d 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2001) (rejecting Yemen court's jurisdiction over dispute
and enforcing arbitral award).
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dispute between the host state and investor, 50 although foreign
adjudication may lead to the very outcome that the host state wished
to avoid. Alternatively, the host state may displace the control of the
arbitral tribunal and foreign court by renegotiating the arbitral
agreement or reaching settlement with the investor prior to a final
award or decision.15" ' Where negotiation has failed and adjudication is
likely to produce highly unattractive results for the host state, states
can repudiate the New York Convention and reject foreign courts'
jurisdiction. Of course, the economic and diplomatic costs of this
strategy are so high that it should be reserved for dire situations. 52
II. APPRAISAL
Although some policy-makers criticize international investment
law as an unjustified attack on sovereignty,'53 an accurate appraisal
150. See, e.g., ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 6.4 (Jan. 1, 1998) (stating that the
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction extends only to "the respective rights of the parties
and to adjudicate their claims and pleas"); Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,
art. 25, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (stating that the ICSID's
jurisdiction only extends to a "legal dispute arising directly out of an investment
between a Contracting State... and a national of another Contracting State").
151. Cf UNCTAD, supra note 34, at 92-93 (noting that bilateral investments
treaties generally require the investor and the host country to attempt to resolve a
dispute amicably before submitting it to arbitration).
152. See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 445 (1995) (arguing that states can ignore compensation demands
for their non-compliance with investment norms, but that this strategy leads to
exclusion from the investment infrastructure).
153. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 383-86
(2003) (stating that after NAFTA Chapter 11 cases were filed against the United
States, U.S. policy-makers complained that international arbitration infringes
national prerogatives); Interview with James H. Carter, President, Am. Soc'y Int'l
L., ASIL Newsletter May/July 2004 1, 10 (speculating that bodies such as NAFTA
tribunals are causing a backlash because they require a relinquishment of
sovereignty that destabilizes domestic political groups); Adam Liptak, Review of
U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, § 1 at
20 (noting that Chief Justice Margaret Marshall of the Massachusetts Court stated
in relation to international investment law's erosion of U.S. judicial authority, "[t]o
say I was surprised to hear that a judgment of this court was being subjected to
further review [by a NAFTA tribunal] would be an understatement" and that a
Georgetown University law school professor has described this phenomenon as
"the biggest threat to United States judicial independence").
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of international investment law's redistribution of sovereign power
and authority should be more nuanced. Power and authority in
themselves have limited normative content. For the most part, the
virtue or vice of power and authority depends on how they are
deployed and with what effect.154 Therefore, the distribution of
decision-making power among decision-makers in the international
investment framework is not, without more, either conclusively ideal
or abhorrent. To appraise international investment law properly, the
consequences of its shifts in power and authority must be measured
against international investment law's global policies.
International investment law has two competing goals. The first
goal is promoting global economic growth, which is presumably
propelled by international investments.'55 These investments require
a stable global marketplace. 156 Stability necessarily entails limiting
the range of actions available to participants so that their behavior
and responses to events are predictable.
This goal of promoting economic growth is, however, inimical to
international investment law's second goal: respecting sovereignty.
Sovereignty entails the freedom of a self-identified territorial
community to act, especially in response to changing circumstances
and threats. Restricting participants' actions and responses in the
global marketplace correspondingly limits sovereignty. Conversely,
because sovereignty entails the widest freedom to act, it increases
uncertainty and destabilizes settled investment expectations. Ceteris
154. Cf JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 229 (1979) (arguing that the rule of law
"fulfils a subservient role" and is "an instrument for achieving certain goals").
155. See Kenneth Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 503-04 (1998) (recognizing that international investment
flows lead to economic development); see generally Kenneth Vandevelde, The
Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 469, 471 (2000)
(discussing "welfare maximizing effects of free-markets").
156. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974)
("[O]rderliness and predictability [are] essential to ... international business.");
Quaak et al. v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11,
19 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[llntemational commerce depends to a large extent on 'the
ability of merchants to predict the likely consequences of their conduct in overseas
markets'(citations omitted)).
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paribus, this instability discourages investments and puts downward
pressure on global economic growth.
International investment law consequently needs to balance global
economic growth with sovereignty. Although this balance changes in
every situation, the interaction of three broad policies often
determines the correct equilibrium. These policies are: (1) promoting
global investments; (2) distributing values equitably among universal
participants; and (3) preventing and correcting abuses of power and
authority.
A. PROMOTING GLOBAL INVESTMENTS
The first policy of international investment law is to drive global
growth by investments. This policy has been acknowledged by
developed and developing states in countless BITs.157 International
investment law's structure and mechanics are designed to promote
investment. Investment agreements, including contracts and BITs,
stabilize participants' expectations about the treatment of
investments and the investor's duties by signaling the participants'
intentions to comply with standards articulated in the agreements.
Over time, the repetition of these standards in agreements, awards,
decisions and treatises has created shared expectations of appropriate
behavior, upon which participants can build investment relationships.
Because investors tend to be risk-averse, this increase in minimum
order promotes investment.'58 Reducing uncertainty also reduces the
cost of investments to investors and host states because investors
often account for political and economic risks in their pricing of
investments.
International investment law's triggers, apart from transferring
power, also directly promote global investments by bringing more
participants into the global marketplace. Each investment agreement
157. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 27, 1993, 1996
U.K.T.S. No. 102, 3, pmbl. ("Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater
investment by nationals and companies of one State in the territory of the other
State .... ").
158. See SEID, supra note 135, at 44 ("Among the most important factors an
investor considers before deciding to invest in a foreign country are the host
country's treatment of foreign investors .... ").
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that transfers power and authority places its investment parties in the
international investment framework and creates more pathways for
resources to be exchanged. Capitalist theories assume this increase in
access to markets promotes growth and development.'59
Further inquiry is, however, necessary to determine the extent that
transfers of power and authority in international investment law
promote investments. 160 Whenever investor protections do not
increase investments and promote growth, international investment
law's transfers of power and authority could be normatively
unjustified. The salient test is: if the international investment law
preserved state power and authority and offered fewer protections to
investors, will investments cost more and dwindle in volume?
At a minimum, investors seek basic protections, such as
compensation for expropriation. 6 1 Without basic protections,
investors could be reluctant to export capital to foreign states no
matter how high the potential returns because profits would be
vulnerable to political risks beyond investors' control. For this
reason, almost every BIT and many investment agreements contain
agreements to arbitrate or litigate in a forum investors regard as
neutral. 162 Whenever the investor is unfamiliar with the host state's
legal system or believes that its judiciary would not be sympathetic
to the investor's interests, arbitration agreements or forum selection
clauses are critical preconditions to investment.
In contrast, more aggressive protections, such as elevating all
investment undertakings into treaty obligations, are often not critical
159. See, e.g., Thomas Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement
Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 639-40 (1995) (noting the shift in theoretical thinking about
foreign direct investment from emphasizing corporate regulation to focusing on
liberalizing government policies); see SEID, supra note 135, at 39 ("The realization
that FDI can play an important role in the development of a country has spurred
competition between host countries for such investment.").
160. See UNCTAD, supra note 34, at 122 (1998) (presenting data showing that
BITs have had a weak influence on foreign direct investments).
161. See Kenneth Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second
Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 702 (1993) (noting that the United States has
consistently insisted on expropriation compensation and arbitration clauses in their
BITs).
162. See UNCTAD, supra note 34, at 95-96 (1998) (describing arbitral
mechanisms in BITs).
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to promoting investments because an investor's basic investment is
secure even without such aggressive protections. Profit-driven
corporations may run significant risks where high returns are
possible. 163 Such investors may be willing to forego aggressive
investment protections if these protections would prevent or delay
their deals' closings. 64
In the CME dispute, the investment agreements did not contain a
liquidated damages provision accounting for future profits, even
though such contractually provided-for damages would have placed
on firm ground the foreign investor's claim for lost profits when
investment plans went awry. 165 Further, Mr. Lauder invested in
CNTS even though the Czech-Netherlands BIT did not expressly
provide for lost future profits as compensation.1 66 Under these
circumstances, CME's belated claim for lost profits after its
investment had vaporized and there was no hope of a further profit
except by pursuing arbitration suggests that the protection of future
profits was not a pre-condition for CME's investment, but only
figured prominently in the foreign investors' minds when their
investment arrangement fell apart.
In sum, basic transfers of state power and authority to investors
and tribunals by international investment law can be appraised
favorably because they support the policy of promoting investment
and development. More aggressive investment protections, although
163. See id. at 122 n.10 (quoting German government's statement that "BITs
definitely are not the condition sine qua non for foreign investors' decision [sic]").
164. For example, although investors often wish to protect the confidentiality of
their investment arbitrations, investors still invest in foreign states under bilateral
investment treaties, which do not generally provide that investment arbitrations are
confidential. Further, investors seem to accept arbitration rules that do not protect,
or inadequately protect, their confidentiality. See Alexis Brown, Presumption
Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in International
Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 969, 992-99 (2001) (arguing that
most arbitration institutions' rules do not provide, or inadequately provide
confidentiality).
165. See generally CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Partial
Award), slip op. 1-24 (UNCITRAL, Sept. 13, 2001) (discussing CME's
investment agreements).
166. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op.
at 32-55 (UNCITRAL, March 14, 2003) (describing CME's claim for future
profits).
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likely to become established over time because of the current trend
towards ever-greater investment protection, should be viewed with
some suspicion because any positive effect these protections may
have on global investments is insufficiently supported by evidence.
B. DISTRIBUTING VALUES EQUITABLY
International investment law, through its redistribution of state
power and authority, should equitably distribute values, i.e., the
universe of tangible and intangible benefits, interests and
resources.'67 Equity should be measured between investors and
states, and among states. As between investors and states, investors
should receive fair returns on their investments, while states should
derive benefits for their communities and retain sufficient power and
authority to govern these communities and participate effectively in
global decision-making. As among states, international investment
law should help all states develop and participate effectively in
global decision-making.
Distributing values equitably is important for three reasons. First,
it is a matter of fundamental fairness that values should be
distributed in a balanced manner. This notion of balance, as the
Government of Kuwait v. Aminoil tribunal has recognized, is inherent
in our concept of law:
[W]ith reference to every long-term contract, especially such as involve
an important investment, there must necessarily be economic calculations,
and the weighing up of rights and obligations, of chances and risks,
constituting the contractual equilibrium .... It is in this fundamental
equilibrium that the very essence of the contract consists. 168
Second, international law's most fundamental goal of promoting
global well-being can only be supported if states and corporations,
which are responsible for their nationals, employees and
shareholders, receive sufficient benefits through international
investments to improve the well-being of their constituents and
stakeholders.
167. See FRANCK, supra note 152, at 9-22 (arguing that international lawyers
"should focus on issues of fairness in the law").
168. Gov't of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) (Award), 66
INT'L .L. REPORTS 519, 603 (Mar. 24, 1982) (emphasis added).
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Third, distributing values equitably creates perceptions of fairness.
Professor Amy Chua has argued persuasively that perpetuating
inequities runs the risk of backlashes against markets and market-
dominant minorities because a prolonged period of extreme inequity
creates an explosive mix of resentment, envy and fear among the
market-subservient majority.' 69 Disfranchised populations may put
pressure on their governments to retaliate violently or even self-
destructively, or they may retaliate without the assistance of their
government in a way that overcomes the asymmetries of global
power-by committing acts of terrorism. 70
1. Investor-State Equity
The distribution of power and authority in international investment
law is producing mixed results in regards to investor-state equity.
International law has few crystallized constraints on participants
during the negotiation and conclusion of investment agreements.
Beyond customary law's prohibitions against fraud and coercion,
71
there are hardly any clear norms to ensure that investment treaties are
established upon a fundamental equilibrium that the Aminoil tribunal
referred to as the "very essence of the contract. 17' Likewise, the
validity of investment contracts, which is determined in accordance
with the contracts' choice of law clauses, is usually not dependent on
any equilibrium of values in the agreements.
Due to the lack of controls over the conclusion of international
investment agreements, some agreements have created real and
perceived inequities between investors and nationals, resulting in
violent protests that undermined investment projects at tremendous
costs to investors, states and other participants. For example, in the
mid-1 990s, Venezuela granted to ICA Holdings, a Mexican
169. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 234-5 (2003) (describing anti-Americanism
as a type of adverse reaction that the market subservient majority has to the
perceived "disproportionate wealth and power" held by the United States).
170. See id. at 254-58 (examining different instances of "homicidal fury" by
members of resentful and relatively impoverished groups); SCHACHTER, supra note
10, at 61 (emphasizing that equity and distributive justice are vital considerations
for creating durable international arrangements).
171. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, arts. 49, 51,
52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that fraud or coercion invalidates treaties).
172. Kuwait v. Aminoil, 66 INT'L L. REPORTS at 603.
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company, a concession for the improvement and maintenance of its
Caracas-La Guaira Highway System. Venezuela, pursuant to its
concession obligations, increased highway tolls by four to twenty-
fold to finance the project, even though the new rates were
unacceptable to Venezuelans. Major protests erupted, eventually
disrupting the toll system. This backlash against investors and
markets brought the concession to a halt: in September 2002, ICA
abandoned the highway.'73 Although the investor recovered some
damages in an arbitral proceeding against Venezuela, these damages
did not fully ameliorate the consequences of inequity: Venezuela's
economy was damaged through the protests, both parties had to bear
the costs of arbitration and prior dispute resolution negotiations, and
Venezuelans were injured in the protests.'74
Although international investment law exerts inadequate control
over the conclusion of investment agreements to ensure that such
agreements are equitable to states and investors, control mechanisms
can correct imbalances after investment agreements are concluded.
When agreements are or become inequitable, a state party has a self-
help remedy: it can restore power and authority by expropriating the
investment and allowing tribunals to adjudicate disputes concerning
perceived inequities.
However, arbitral awards reveal that international investment law
provides inconsistent support for the policy of equity. Whereas the
determination of whether a state is responsible for failed investments
accounts for equitable considerations, the assessment of damages
once a state is found responsible may ignore the need to reach an
equitable outcome. When appraising liability at the merits stage of
proceedings, tribunals often account for context and policy concerns
to correct inequitable investment arrangements, 75 such as when
determining if non-discrimination provisions which prohibit treating
173. Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, slip op. 1-50 (Sept. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/AwardTotal.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2004).
174. See id. (noting the detrimental effects of the investment project).
175. See Azinian v. United Mexican States (Award), ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2, 105-15 (Nov. 1, 1999) (finding Mexico justified in canceling
waste management concession granted as a result of unconscionable and
incomplete representations by the U.S. investor).
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foreigners less favorably than nationals have been violated. The
tribunal in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Canada (Partial Award)
stated: "an evaluation of 'like situations' in the investment context
should take into account policy objectives,"'17 6 and that the key
inquiry is "whether the different treatment of situations found to be
'like' is justified by legitimate public policy measures that are
pursued in a reasonable manner."'
177
In Genin v. Republic of Estonia, the tribunal determined that
Estonia's regulatory investigations against the Estonian Innovation
Bank, which was controlled by U.S. citizen Alex Genin, were non-
discriminatory and "constituted entirely legitimate and fully proper
exercises of the central bank's regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities.' ' 78 The tribunal accounted for:
the particular context in which the dispute arose, namely, that of a
recently nascent independent state, coming rapidly to grips with the
reality of modem financial, commercial and banking practices and the
emergence of state institutions responsible for overseeing and regulating
areas of activity perhaps previously unknown. 1
79
The Genin and S.D. Myers awards accordingly show that for the
purposes of establishing liability, international investment law may
consider whether the distribution of values between states and
investors is equitable.
In contrast, awards of damages run the risk of inequities between
states and investors because compensation standards do not tend to
account for equity. International investment law gives scant regard to
the possibility that compensation to investors may debilitate the host
176. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Canada (Partial Award), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 248
(2001) (UNCITRAL, Nov. 12, 2000); see GAMI Invs., Inc. v. Gov't of the United
Mexican States (Final Award), slip op., 114 (UNCITRAL, Nov. 15, 2004)
(holding Mexico's expropriation of sugar mills owned by a corporation in which
the claimant had shares was not discriminatory even though other sugar mills were
not expropriated because the expropriation "was plausibly connected with a
legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar industry was in the hands of
solvent enterprises)").
177. S.D. Myers, Inc. (PartialAward), 41 I.L.M. 1408 at 246.
178. Genin v. Republic of Estonia (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, slip op.
353 (June 25, 2001).
179. Id. 348.
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state. The majority of the CME tribunal did not consider whether the
Czech Republic would be able to bear the cost of its $270 million
award. 180 Although compensation in a number of international law
contexts is capped to avoid an overwhelming financial burden for
states,18 1 the majority of the CME tribunal did not acknowledge this
norm. Under prevailing standards of compensation in international
investment law, a state's economy may be debilitated if the state is
compelled to regain its power and authority from other decision-
makers.
2. Inter-State Equity
In addition to condoning inequities between states and investors,
international investment law perpetuates certain inter-state inequities
when it inflicts different outcomes on weak and powerful states.
Some arbitral tribunals deciding claims against developing states
have found these states responsible for the losses suffered by foreign
investors because they deemed the states' courts' decisions against
the investor to constitute denials of justice. In Amco Asia Corp. v.
Republic of Indonesia, English barrister and International Court of
Justice judge Rosalyn Higgins chaired the arbitral tribunal that
determined that the Indonesian judiciary's denial of justice to Amco
incurred state responsibility for Indonesia to compensate Amco for
its investments.'82 Likewise, in Himpurna California Energy Ltd.
(Interim Award), the tribunal chaired by Freshfields Bruckhaus
180. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (separate
opinion of Ian Brownlie), slip op. 75 (noting imbalance between amount of
damages awarded and Czech Republic's ability to pay it).
181. See SCHACHTER, supra note 10, at 324 ("[A] good case can be made that
'less than full value would be just compensation' when the State would otherwise
have an 'overwhelming financial burden."'); CME Czech Republic B. V (Final
Award) (separate opinion of Ian Brownlie), slip op. 77-78 (noting international
law principle against subjecting state to "economic ruin"); Vladimir-Djuro Degan,
State Succession Especially in Respect of State Property and Debts, 4 FINN. Y.B
INT'L L. 130, 191 (1993) (explaining that equity limits quantum of predecessor
state's debts for which successor states became responsible to ensure that successor
states survived as viable entities).
182. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Resubmitted Case, Award,
Supplemental Decision and Rectification), ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID
(W. Bank) 569, 136-37, 146-52 (May 31, 1990, Oct. 10. 1991).
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Deringer partner Jan Paulsson held Indonesia responsible for its
court's injunction purporting to suspend the arbitral proceedings. 183
In contrast, in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America, a
tribunal chaired by former Australia High Court Chief Justice
Anthony Mason found the United States not responsible for its
court's flagrant denials of justice that eviscerated a foreign investor's
investments. The Canadian Loewen Group were embroiled in a
dispute with Mississippi companies owned by the O'Keefes over
contracts worth around $1 million and the exchange of two O'Keefe
funeral homes worth $2.5 million for a Loewen insurance company
valued at $4 million. 184 The Mississippi court that adjudicated the
dispute allowed racial and class biases to infect the trial.'85 The
tribunal condemned the trial as a "disgrace," and stated that "by any
standard of evaluation, the trial judge failed to afford Loewen the
process that was due."' 8 6 At the end of the trial, the jury awarded
$400 million in punitive damages to the U.S. plaintiff against the
foreign party.'87 Unable to appeal this decision without going into
bankruptcy because the bond for appeal under Mississippi law was
$625 million, Loewen settled the case for $175 million. 88
Unlike the Amco and Himpurna tribunals, the Loewen tribunal
refused to find the United States responsible for Loewen's losses as a
result of the U.S. court's denial of justice. The NAFTA tribunal
determined that denial of justice in international law is only perfected
where the investor has exhausted all local remedies, including
appealing to the highest court of the host state.'89 Although the
tribunal acknowledged Loewen's inability to post the $625 million
183. Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia (Interim
Award), 15-1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. A-I, A-29-A-34 (2000) (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 26, 1999).
184. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America (Award), ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811, 812-13 (2003) (June 26, 2003).
185. Id. 4 (indicating that the judge permitted a number of prejudicial
references by O'Keefe, including references to Loewen's foreign nationality and
race-based distinctions between the parties).
186. Id. 119.
187. Id. 101.
188. Id. TT 7, 209 (noting that Loewen entered into a settlement when it could
instead have filed for bankruptcy to stay the execution of the award).
189. Id. TT 167-71.
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bond,' 190 the tribunal reasoned that Loewen nonetheless failed to
exhaust local remedies because Loewen could have gone into
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and appealed against the state court
decision.' 9' Alternatively, the tribunal decided Loewen could have
petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court with an application for a stay of
execution of the judgment against the bond requirement. 192
The Loewen award is remarkable. The exhaustion of local
remedies is not an unyielding international law principle.19' Neither
the Amco nor Himpurna tribunals articulated this purported condition
precedent for denial of justice. Indeed, in Himpurna, local remedies
were far from exhausted: like Loewen, Himpurna did not appeal the
host state's lower court decision to Indonesia's highest court before
pursuing arbitration. 94
Even if the exhaustion of local remedies is applicable to denial of
justice claims, by the Loewen tribunal's own admission, the
international law rule is that remedies must effectively be exhausted
rather than absolutely exhausted. 195 The tribunal's finding that
Loewen should have petitioned to the Supreme Court, which would
have had a very limited chance of succeeding, rather than settle for a
third of the verdict prompted Swiss arbitrator Jacques Werner to
190. Id. T 185 ("[T]he provision of absolute security was beyond the capacity of
[Loewen].").
191. Id. 214-17.
192. Id. 210; see also Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America
(Supplementary Decision), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Aug. 17, 2004),
TT 19-20 (upholding award), available at http://www.intemational-economic-
law.org/Loewen/Loewen%20%20Decision%20on%20Request%20for/ 20Reconsi
deration.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
193. See A.A. CACADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-12 (1983)
(challenging the local remedies rule); SCHACHTER, supra note 10, at 213
(proposing limitations to the exhaustion of local remedies rule).
194. See GAMI Invs., Inc. v. Gov't of the United Mexican States (Final Award)
(UNCITRAL, Nov. 15, 2004), slip op., T 38(B) (stating that foreign investor "is
entitled to seek international relief on account of wrongful expropriation" even
though investor had not sought any relief before the host state's courts).
195. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America (Award), ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811, TT 167-68 (2003) (June 26, 2003) (stating that
the local remedies rule "is an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective
and adequate and are reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances
in which is it situated"(emphasis added)).
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exclaim: "In what world does the Arbitral Tribunal live?" 196 The
notion that an international law claim can only be pursued by going
into bankruptcy similarly bears no relation to commercial realities or
business practices.
Whatever the technical merits or flaws of the Loewen award, it
raises serious equitable issues. The Loewen award creates the
perception, if not reality, that international law inequitably distributes
power and authority among states. Whereas weak states lose judicial
power over disputes and their decisions are arguably reviewed by
tribunals, powerful states such as the United States seem to be less
vulnerable to such review. The Loewen tribunal concluded that the
review of U.S. decisions was for the state "to regulate according to
its own chosen appreciation of the ends of justice" (emphasis
added).'97 This state of affairs has caused further antagonism against
global market-dominant minorities such as the United States. As one
U.S. reporter observed: "the U.S. victory would anger many
investment lawyers around the world who saw Loewen's loss as
proof that the United States will not abide by the rules it imposes on
others."'19
In fairness, the Loewen tribunal may have felt constrained not to
issue an award against the United States in spite of the U.S. court's
egregious violations of international investment law. U.S. policy-
makers have long sought to limit international law's authority over
the United States if they perceived that this authority could be
deployed against U.S. interests. Two years ago, Senator John Kerry
sponsored a bill that would weaken investor protections under
NAFTA out of fear that the United States would face billions of
dollars in claims yearly. 99 President George W. Bush similarly
withdrew United State's support for several important multilateral
treaties, including the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Climate Change
196. Michael D. Goldhaber, NAFTA Suit is Alive, Kicking, NAT'L L. J., Vol. 26,
No. 26 at I (Mar. 1, 2004) (quoting Jacques Werner).
197. Loewen Group, Inc. (Award), 42 I.L.M. 811, 242.
198. Goldhaber, supra note 196.
199. S.A. 3430 (Kerry Amendment to H.R. 3009), 107"' Cong., 148 Cong. Rec.
S4504 (2002) (proposing, inter alia, that foreign investors receive no greater legal
rights than U.S. citizens and that international law's minimum treatment norm
offer no greater protection than the U.S. Constitution's due process clause).
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Treaty and the Rome Convention °.2 ° The Loewen tribunal may well
have been concerned that a decision against the United States could
provoke the United States to deploy its global power to weaken
international investment law's infrastructure. 20 1 The Loewen tribunal
hinted at this consideration when it stated "[t]oo great a readiness to
step from outside into the domestic arena ... will damage ... the
viability of NAFTA itself. 20 2 If this assessment is accurate, it could
certainly justify a modicum of sympathy for the tribunal. This
assessment also regrettably supports the criticism that international
investment law redistributes values inequitably among states because
important decision-makers like NAFTA tribunals, out of fear of
retaliation against the international infrastructure by a superpower,
deploy their authority to support that superpower.
C. PREVENTING AND CORRECTING ABUSES
When international investment law fails to support its policies of
promoting investment and distributing values equitably, international
investment law should deploy corrective mechanisms. Early
intervention mechanisms against investors or states that abuse power
and authority include negotiation among investors and states,
diplomatic pressure by the state of the investor's incorporation and
other interested states, and signals by the international business
community about appropriate investment behavior.
When these strategies do not succeed, international investment
law's next corrective mechanism is adjudication by arbitral tribunals
or foreign courts, which power and authority are triggered by forum
selection clauses or arbitration agreements. Such tribunals often
correct deviations from international investment law's policies.
Where an investor has abused its power, the host state is permitted to
unilaterally claim back its authority and power over its resources and
200. See President Bill Clinton, Address at the Democratic National Convention
(June 26, 2004), in Clinton: Time Again to Choose a More Perfect Union, CNN,
July 27, 2004 (noting the international treaties for which the Bush administration
withdrew support), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/26/
dems.clinton.transcript (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
201. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 153, at 399 (arguing that investment
arbitration must accommodate political realities and host state interests to avoid a
backlash against investor victories).
202. Loewen Group, Inc. (Award), 42 I.L.M. 811 242.
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investment, such as in the Genin award.2 °3 Conversely, where an
investor has not abused its power but the host state desires to restore
its authority over sovereign matters, the host state is required to
compensate the investor, such as in the SPP award. 2°
Arbitral tribunals' power and authority are buttressed by foreign
courts' enforcement powers. This collusion of authority is usually
sufficient to restore international investment law's policies, even if
such restoration requires years of litigation. In 1978, the Arab
Organization for Industrialization ("AOI"), which had been formed
by Qatar, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, contracted with
Westland to purchase military helicopters. After the Camp David
Accords were signed, AOI withdrew from the investment in 1979.
ICC arbitration was commenced in 1980, and, in 1993, a final award
was entered against AOI for $385 million, and Westland was found
to owe $30 million advanced on the project. This award was
confirmed by the Swiss Supreme Court in the same year. U.S.,
French and English courts then granted enforcement against AOI's
and its member states' foreign assets. These enforcement actions
eventually pressured the Arab states and AOI to settle with
Westland. Westland settled the U.S. action for $25 million, the
French action for $115 million, and finally, in 1994, the English
action for $50 million and a write-off of Westland's $30 million
advance.20 5 This dispute's resolution through implicit cooperation
between investors, tribunals, courts and states represents a typical
global decision-making process that corrects imbalances.
203. See Genin v. Republic of Estonia (Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, slip
op. 363 (June 25, 2001) (finding Estonia's revocation of foreign investor's
banking license justified by investor's abuse).
204. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt
(Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 189, 226-27, 158-59
(May 20, 1992) (stating that a state may cancel an foreign investment project to
protect its antiquities, but must pay compensation to the foreign investor).
205. See Westland Helicopters Settles Dispute Over 385 Million Award, 9-8
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (Aug. 1994) (describing Westland dispute);
Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, 1995 Q.B.
282 (Eng.) (detailing history of Westland dispute).
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1. Imperfect Control over Investment Parties
In spite of international law's tremendous power and authority, it
is not always able to control powerful states. As the Loewen award
indicates, powerful states can undermine international investment
law's policies without incurring high costs that are routinely imposed
on weaker states when decision-makers defer to powerful states.
Such deference undermines international law's corrective policy.
Less powerful states can also elect to incur the costs of opposing
the authority of international investment law, thereby overcoming its
corrective authority. In the Himpurna dispute, MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Co. pursued arbitrations against its Indonesian investment
partner for lost investments and obtained an award of almost $400
million. The Indonesian partner ignored this award. When
MidAmerican commenced UNCITRAL arbitration against Indonesia
under Indonesia's investment guarantee, Indonesia attempted to
influence its party-appointed arbitrator through numerous ex parte
communications. When this strategy failed, Indonesia sent agents to
a Netherlands airport to escort the arbitrator to Indonesia so that a
full tribunal could not* be constituted. Even though the incomplete
tribunal issued a final award against Indonesia, Indonesia ignored
this award and MidAmerican had to claim $290 million in political
risk insurance coverage for its losses. 2°6 By persistently ignoring
international law's authority, even less powerful states can
sometimes undermine international investment law's policies.
2. Tribunals' Misuse ofAuthority
In addition to lacking an authoritative response to states and
investors that effectively ignore tribunals and courts, international
investment law does not currently have a complete response when
tribunals and courts misdirect their authority to undermine
international investment laws policies. Investment parties are
attracted to arbitration because, inter alia, the limited right of appeal
places the winning party in a stronger bargaining position to settle
after an award has been rendered. This limited right of appeal
206. Indonesia Doesn't Pay Awards; MidAmerican Energy Get $290 Million on
Political Risk Claim Insurance Coverage, 14-12 MEALEYS' INT'L ARB. REP. 1
(Dec. 1999) (describing Indonesia's refusal to pay award and investor's recourse to
insurers).
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supports international investment law's policies when tribunals reach
the right decision, but poses serious problems for global policies
when tribunals reach the wrong decision, such as when wildly
extravagant damages are awarded, as in the CME award, or when
tribunals decline to deploy their authority and power to correct
investor-state inequities, as in the Loewen award.
Although annulment proceedings provide some control, this is an
incomplete mechanism because tribunals and courts may only review
the award for limited abuses such as the failure to state reasons or for
manifestly exceeding the tribunal's powers.2 °7 The CME and Loewen
awards would probably withstand review under these standards.
Because these limitations on review are necessary to protect the
finality and efficacy of arbitration,2 °8 annulment proceedings are
likely to be effective only against the most egregious abuses of
arbitral authority.2"9
International investment law's imperfect review is supplemented
by another imperfect control: enforcement proceedings in national
courts. A claimant often pressurizes the losing party to settle after an
award is obtained by seeking enforcement orders in states where the
losing party has assets. By refusing to enforce an unjust award,
national courts can rectify the inequities of the award.
However, the criteria for refusing to enforce an award are not
directed at promoting international investment law's policies, but at
protecting national interests. Article 5 of the New York Convention
207. See ICSID Convention, supra note 150, at art. 52 (stating grounds for
application for annulment of arbitral award); Maritime International Nominees
Establishment v. Republic of Guinea (Decision on Annulment), ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4, 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 79, 86-88 (Dec. 22, 1989) (clarifying limited
grounds for annulment); Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine
Republic (Decision on Annulment), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 41 I.L.M. 1135
62-63 (2002), (July 3, 2002), (stating that annulment may be granted only on
grounds set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention and not for "a trivial
cause").
208. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in
ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 744 (1989) (arguing additional layers of
control increase a range of costs).
209. But see ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the framework for
ICSID Arbitration (Oct. 22, 2004), at 14-16 (noting that investment treaties
increasingly create appeals mechanisms and that an ICSID appeal process could
foster coherence in case law emerging under investment treaties).
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allows a court to refuse to enforce an award if the award contradicts
a fundamental state policy, but there is no provision for the refusal to
enforce an award that is contrary to international investment law's
policies.210 Although limiting exceptions to enforcement promotes
finality and predictability in arbitration, these limitations also result
in highly-imperfect controls over abusive tribunals.
3. Weak Res Judicata and Lis Pendens Controls
Stronger controls are also needed over investors that pursue
substantially similar claims in multiple forums. Investors may use
different corporate forms to pursue claims for recovery of the
investment under different investment agreements,2 ' including BITs
and contracts, thereby multiplying their chances of recovery. Multi-
forum arbitration can lead to two or more tribunals issuing
contradictory awards. Such conflicting jurisprudence muddies the
content of investment norms and can confuse participants when these
norms are applied to facts.
In the CME dispute, in addition to the CME claim under the
Netherlands-Czech BIT, CME's controlling shareholder, Robert
Lauder, pursued an almost identical claim, with the same allegations,
on the same facts, under almost identically-worded provisions of the
U.S.-Czech BIT. The two tribunals reached conflicting conclusions.
While the CME tribunal found that the Czech Republic had violated
the investor treaty protections and that these violations had caused
CME to lose its investment, the Lauder tribunal found that the Czech
Republic had only acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner
through its Media Council's revocation of its initial decision to allow
CEDC to invest directly in CET 21, but that this revocation did not
cause CME to lose its investments.2 12
210. New York Convention, supra note 6, art. 5 (providing that a state may
refuse to enforce an award that is contrary to its public policy).
211. See Lauder v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op. 175 (UNCITRAL,
Sept. 3, 2001) (stating that the claimant, by pursuing arbitration in his own
capacity and through his company, was "seeking the same remedies in a different
fora"); Brown, supra note 164, at 1017 ("Complex international business
transactions often produce multiple disputes involving several parties.").
212. Lauder (Final Award), slip op. 222-35.
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Despite the similarity of claims in CME and Lauder, the CME
tribunal, which rendered its interim award after the Lauder final
award, did not feel constrained by Lauder. The CME tribunal
reasoned that "the application of international law rules on
interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of different
treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia,
differences in the respective texts, objects and purposes, subsequent
practice and travaux preparatoires."'2  The CME tribunal did not
elaborate on the application of this approach to the facts, and
observers, including investors, host states and their attorneys, are left
to wonder how the CME tribunal reached opposite results even
though the objects and purposes of both BITS and the subsequent
practice of the Czech Republic in relation to investments were
similar.
Although the CME awards might be technically distinguishable
from the Lauder award, 14 and indeed the Czech Republic had
objected to being bound by the Lauder award in the CME
arbitration,21 5 the different outcomes on the same facts and
substantially similar investor protections creates uncertainty in the
law and encourages investors to forum shop. In order to protect the
policies of equity and promoting investments, international
investment law should develop stronger mechanisms to prevent an
investment participant from pursuing similar claims in multiple
forums. 216
213. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Final Award), slip op. 433
(UNCITRAL, March 14, 2003).
214. See Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V., Case No. T 9737-01,
slip op. at 69-71, 95-98 (Svea Ct. App. May 13, 2003) (translation in English)
(holding lis pendens and res judicata requirements not satisfied by CME award),
available at http://www.mfcr.cz/index-en.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2004); Hans
Bagner, Swedish Appeals Court "Strikes Delicate Balance" in Czech Republic v.
CME, 18-6 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 34, 36 (June 2003) (discussing Swedish
court's holding that there was no lis pendens and resjudicata between Lauder and
CME awards).
215. See CME Czech Republic B. V (Final Award), slip op. 428 (noting that
Czech Republic did not agree to consolidate CME and Lauder arbitrations). The
Czech Republic's strategy is difficult to understand, because its refusal to join
proceedings doubled its chances of losing.
216. See Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Preliminary Objections)
(Serb. & Mont. v. Fr.), Joint Declaration of Vice President Ranjeva, Judges
Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, slip
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Decision-makers can strengthen international investment law and
overcome its present shortcomings. By appraising international
investment law's intricate power and authority dynamics, the
strengths and defects of international investment law become clear.
International investment law's policies can be better promoted
through five structural adjustments.
First, in order to promote investments while preserving a state's
authority and power to adjust to changing circumstances for the
benefit of its communities, consumers of foreign capital should
carefully consider which investment protections are required and
which are unnecessary to attract capital. Arbitral tribunals and courts
should also use this policy approach to help determine appropriate
investment behavior and compensation standards. Such an approach,
if widely adopted by decision-makers, should protect legitimate
expectations without legitimizing wild expectations.
Second, in order to avoid investor-state inequities, states and
investors need to carefully calculate the immediate and hidden costs
of investment agreements before entering into an investment project.
When investors and states decide to embark on an investment
project, they should manage the local communities' expectations
about the project's likely positive and negative impacts. Properly
managed expectations minimize the risk of backlashes against
perceived inequities. A deeper structural change would be to
prescribe that, like the doctrine of unconscionability in some national
legal systems, manifestly imbalanced investment agreements are
invalid. However, this is a controversial proposal which needs an
extended period of signaling between participants before it may be
widely accepted.
Third, as international investment law increases its power and
authority, this authority should be exerted over both powerful and
weak decision-makers to demand equal compliance with
international norms. When non-compliance is anticipated, the
damage to international law from permitting deviant behavior to go
uncorrected must be carefully balanced against the damage to
op., 3 (I.C.J. Dec. 15, 2004) ("Consistency is the essence of judicial reasoning.
This is especially true in different phase of the same case or with regard to closely
related cases.").
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international law from having a participant ignore demands for
compliance. In many situations, prescribing normatively undesirable
outcomes to secure the compliance of powerful states causes more
structural damage than making the correct normative demand and
having that demand ignored. Once international investment law's
legitimacy is lost, international investment law's authority and power
to promote its policies vaporizes.217
Fourth, efficacy and finality require that corrections do not
continue ad infinitum. Instead, arbitral tribunals and courts should
properly perform their corrective functions in the first instance.
Arbitrators, like judges, need to be carefully selected. Although ad
hoc party-appointed arbitrators might have different considerations
from impartial judges with security of tenure, arbitrators should
account for international investment law's global policies when
resolving disputes. Arbitrators have a constitutive effect on law
because their signals on appropriate investment behavior are
observed by many participants and are often followed. To use this
authority properly, arbitrators ought to be pro-investment, not pro-
investor or pro-state.
Fifth, decision-makers should prevent multi-forum adjudication to
protect international investment law's predictability and legitimacy.
Investment agreements should restrict adjudication to one mutually
acceptable forum. If parties pursue dispute resolution in multiple
arenas, decision-makers should implicitly or expressly co-ordinate
their responses. Investment parties may be prevailed upon to
consolidate proceedings, and tribunals should acknowledge the
appropriate resjudicata and lispendens effect of prior decisions.
These five proposals should steer international investment law as
it hurtles along its growth trajectory.218 Barring a cataclysmic geo-
political event which fundamentally alters international investment
law's decision-making process, the benefits of international
investments are too great for states and corporations to contemplate
217. Cf Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the International Credibility
of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-
Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288,
302 (Lori Damrosch ed., 1987) ("[T]he [ICJ] must have the support of a broad
spectrum of the international community in order to function effectively.").
218. See Sacerdoti, supra note 9, at 261-75 (identifying the trend towards
greater investments).
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withdrawing from global investment markets.2 9 National courts have
recognized the importance of international investment to their
economies and are generally supporting international investment
law.220 Pro-investment arbitrators will continue issuing awards that
support global investment. In this inescapable investment network,
we have a shared responsibility to increase everyone's well-being by
adjusting international investment law's decision-making processes
to further harmonize its goals and better promote its policies.
219. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 9, at xi ("Foreign direct investment is
today the largest single source of external finance for developing countries");
UNCTAD, supra note 34, at 146 ("[T]he number of TNCs [transnational
corporations] headquartered in developing countries is growing and more TNCs
are seeking to expand abroad."); Stephen M. Schwebel, Report of the Committee
on Nationalization of Property of the American Branch of the International Law
Association, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 385-86 (1994) ("Economic
interdependence is universal and acute.").
220. See, e.g., Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354(6th Cir. 1992) ("The modem era is one of world economic interdependence, and
economic interdependence requires cooperation and comity between nations.").
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